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Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but 
condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not 
purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the 
private beliefs of the student and his or her family.1 
Justice William Brennan, Edwards v. Aguillard 
 
Pondering the Pledge’s possible effects [on his four-year-old daughter, 
Newdow] recited it to her in its pre-1954 form.  After hearing “. . . one 
Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all,” [the] child — without 
a second’s pause — immediately shouted “under God”!  [Newdow] at the 
time didn’t even know she had ever even heard the Pledge before.  Yet, 
apparently from her days in pre-school, she immediately recognized that 
her father had “left out” those two words.2 
Michael Newdow, Atheist Father 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In March 2004, atheist father Michael Newdow argued before 
the United States Supreme Court3 that the daily recitation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance,4 including the phrase “one Nation, under God,” 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2005, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2001, 
Montclair State University.   
 1 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987). 
 2 Original Complaint at ¶ 130, Newdow v. Cong. of the United States, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22366 (E.D.Cal. July 21, 2000) (No. CIV S-00-0495 MLS PAN PS) 
[hereinafter Newdow I]. 
 3 Newdow, a non-practicing attorney, represented himself in the case.  Linda 
Greenhouse, Atheist Presents Case for Taking God from Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2004, 
at A1. 
 4 The Pledge of Allegiance reads: “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United 
States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, 
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”  4 U.S.C. § 4 (Supp. 2004) (emphasis 
added).  The Pledge is recited while standing at attention with the right hand over 
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in his daughter’s public elementary school classroom violates the 
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.5  The crux of 
Newdow’s claim was that the reference to God in the Pledge 
interferes with his parental right to raise his daughter as an atheist 
because it coerces her to believe that God exists.6  The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Newdow,7 igniting a storm 
of controversy,8 and setting the stage for a much-anticipated ruling by 
the Supreme Court.  In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow 
(Newdow III),9 however, the Court failed to reach the merits of the 
case, and reversed the Ninth Circuit because Newdow lacked 
standing.10 
 
the speaker’s heart.  Id. 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . .”). 
 6 See infra Part I.A.1. 
 7 Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter 
Newdow II], rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 
124 S. Ct. 2301, 2312 (2004) [hereinafter Newdow III]. 
 8 The Ninth Circuit’s decision was met with almost universal disapproval.  See, 
e.g., Martin Kasindorf, Court Ruling on the Pledge Ignites Furor, USA TODAY, June 27, 
2002, at 1A.  Eighty-seven percent of Americans surveyed in a Newsweek poll 
conducted shortly after the Newdow II decision felt that “under God” should remain 
in the Pledge.  See Vast Majority in U.S. Support ‘Under God,’ CNN.com (June 30, 2002), 
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/06/29/poll.pledge (last visited Jan. 16, 2005).  
President George W. Bush called the ruling “ridiculous,” while Democratic Senator 
Tom Daschle called it “nuts.”  Evelyn Nieves, Judges Ban Pledge of Allegiance from 
Schools, Citing ‘Under God,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at A1.  Republican New York 
Governor George Pataki added that it was “junk justice.”  Id.  Other superlatives used 
to describe the decision were “appalling” and “absurd,” and the ruling was said to 
have created a “constitutional crisis.”  Id.  Major media outlets were also quick to 
express their disagreement with the decision, however were more tempered in their 
criticism than lawmakers were.  See, e.g., Lance Morrow, Editorial, God Knows What the 
Court was Thinking, TIME MAG., July 8, 2002, at 96 (criticizing the initial insertion of 
“under God” into the Pledge, yet still calling the Ninth Circuit’s decision “stupid” 
because of its timing); Editorial, ‘One Nation Under God,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at 
A28 (stating that although “[w]e wish the words [under God] had not been added 
back in 1954,” the Newdow II ruling “lacks common sense”). 
 9 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). 
 10 Id. at 2312.  Newdow originally brought his Pledge suit on behalf of his 
daughter as her “next friend.”  However, the child’s mother, to whom Newdow never 
married, had sole legal custody over the girl and obtained an order from a California 
state court enjoining Newdow from suing on their daughter’s behalf.  Id. at 2307.  
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit subsequently held that Newdow had Article III 
standing in his own right as a parent to challenge the school district’s pledge policy.  
Id. (citing Newdow v. United States Cong., 313 F.3d 500, 502-03 (9th Cir. 2002)).  
The Supreme Court disagreed, reversing the court of appeals and ruling that 
Newdow lacked “prudential standing” because it would be “improper for the federal 
courts to entertain a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family 
  
2005 COMMENT 741 
 
 
While Newdow III delayed an ultimate resolution of the Pledge 
issue, the arguments made in the decision’s three concurring 
opinions, by the school district in opposition to Newdow, and by 
much of the legal and political community at the time of the case, 
revealed that a satisfactory resolution of the Pledge debate for 
Newdow may never come via the Establishment Clause.  Justices, 
commentators, and politicians alike obfuscated Newdow’s central 
argument that his daughter was being coerced into religious belief 
because she was asked daily to pledge allegiance to a “nation, under 
God,” by asserting unrelated counterarguments that the Pledge does 
not endorse religion.11  Newdow’s coercion argument examines the 
Pledge from the subjective viewpoint of his impressionable young child 
in the particularly coercive atmosphere of the public school 
classroom.12  In response, proponents of the Pledge argue from an 
objective viewpoint: in the eyes of a reasonable observer aware of the 
“history and ubiquity” of the Pledge of Allegiance, the words “under 
God” are merely an acknowledgement of the role religion played in 
the founding of the nation, and not an attempt to endorse religion.13  
From this perspective, “under God” is no different than other 
purportedly acceptable religious references in the public lives of 
Americans, such as the national motto, “In God We Trust.”14 
The battle between these two contrasting viewpoints is a result of 
the Court’s inability to settle on one analytical test as the measure of 
an Establishment Clause violation.15  In support of his claim, Newdow 
naturally relied upon Lee v. Weisman,16 where the Court employed a 
“coercion test” to hold that the Establishment Clause bars a public 
middle school from leading its students in a non-denominational 
prayer during a graduation ceremony because of the religiously 
coercive effect it may have on the young students in the audience.17 
In response, supporters of the Pledge ignored the claim that 
 
law rights that are in dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse 
effect on the person who is the source of the plaintiff’s claimed standing.”  Id. at 
2312. 
 11 See infra Part I.B.1. 
 12 See infra Part I.A.1. 
 13 See infra Part I.B.1. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See infra Part II. 
 16 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 17 Id. at 599.  See infra Part II.A for a further discussion of Lee v. Weisman and its 
coercion test. 
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“under God” is coercive to a child, and instead, utilized the other 
major analytical tool of the Establishment Clause—the endorsement 
test.18  For example, Justice O’Connor, the leading proponent of this 
test, contended in her Newdow III concurring opinion that no 
reasonable observer aware of the “history and ubiquity” of the Pledge 
could possibly view the words “under God” as an endorsement of 
religion or as a prayer, and thus, concluded that the Pledge cannot 
fail the coercion test.19  By taking this approach, the Justice escaped 
the need to apply Lee’s coercion test to the facts of Newdow III, and 
the need to address the real question at the core of Newdow’s 
coercion argument: whether a five-year-old in the context of a 
classroom recitation would view the words “under God” as a coercive 
influence. 
There is a good reason for this avoidance.  Any principled 
application of Lee’s coercion test to Newdow’s claim necessarily leads 
to the conclusion that the use of “under God” in public schools is 
unconstitutional.20  The problem for Newdow is that, as demonstrated 
by Justice O’Connor, an escape-hatch is built into the road leading to 
this conclusion—an application of the Court’s endorsement test 
precedents inevitably leads to the contrary result that the Pledge is 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause.21 
Courts and commentators have assumed that this result is 
impossible because any government use of religion strong enough to 
coerce, a fortiori, must also be strong enough to merely endorse.22  This 
assumption holds true, however, only if the government use of 
religion is substantial enough to coerce the reasonable observer.  In 
contrast, Lee examined the coercive effect a prayer has on a school-
aged child through the eyes of a school-aged child, finding coercion 
because of the impressionable nature of young students in the school 
environment.  Thus, government religious speech strong enough to 
coerce a five-year-old child may not necessarily rise to the level of an 
endorsement of religion in the eyes of a reasonable observer with 
knowledge of the “history and ubiquity” of the religious reference.  A 
five-year-old child is not such a reasonable observer.23 
 
 18 See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the Establishment Clause’s endorsement 
test. 
 19 Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2321-27. 
 20 See infra Part III.A. 
 21 See infra Part III.B. 
 22 See infra Part III.C. 
 23 See id. 
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The conundrum created by this distinction leaves Newdow’s 
coercion claim trapped in an Establishment Clause black hole from 
which the next Newdow24 will need to escape if he or she is to have a 
chance of successfully challenging the use of “under God” in the 
public classroom.  This Comment suggests that the Free Exercise and 
Due Process Clauses present a possible alternative to the 
Establishment Clause for asserting a coercion-based claim against the 
Pledge.  Arguably, the recitation of the Pledge, with “under God,” in 
the public classroom violates the Free Exercise Clause25 by coercing 
impressionable children into religious belief, and thus in turn, also 
violates the fundamental right of atheist parents to direct the 
(non)religious upbringing of their children.26  Such a claim would 
insulate the coercion argument from the endorsement test’s 
reasonable person counterarguments, which are irrelevant to the 
question of whether a five-year-old hearing “under God” everyday is 
coerced into believing that God exists.27 
Part I illustrates the contrast between Newdow’s arguments 
against “under God,” which view the Pledge from the perspective of a 
young, impressionable elementary-school student, and his 
opponents’ arguments, which view the Pledge through the eyes of a 
reasonable observer.  Part II demonstrates how this contrast results 
from the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and its use of 
two main analytical tests—the coercion test and the endorsement 
test.  Part III argues that under current Court precedents, both sides 
of the Newdow Pledge debate are correct: “under God” coerces while 
it does not endorse.  This part goes on to explain how this anomaly 
gives proponents of the Pledge an escape-hatch by which they can 
avoid the inevitable result that the Pledge is unconstitutional under 
Lee.  Part IV proposes that to avoid this problem, the next Newdow 
should argue that the daily repetition of the Pledge, with “under 
God,” in the public classroom coerces a child’s religious beliefs in 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause and the child’s parents’ 
 
 24 The next Newdow may be Newdow himself.  Newdow re-filed his claim against 
the use of “under God” in the Pledge on January 5, 2005 in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of California, however this time with co-plaintiffs who are custodial 
parents, in hopes of remedying his standing problems.  Associated Press, Atheist Files 
Second Suit on ‘Under God’ in Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A19. 
 25 The Free Exercise Clause reads: “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting 
the free exercise [of religion].” U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 26 See infra Part IV. 
 27 See infra Part IV.D. 
   
744 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:739 
 
 
fundamental right to direct their child’s religious upbringing.  Such 
an approach would properly focus the Pledge debate solely upon the 
issue of whether “under God” applies “subtle coercive pressure” on 
impressionable public school children with whom the Court has 
observed “there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of 
conscience.”28 
I. THE PLEDGE DEBATE: A CONTRAST IN PERSPECTIVES 
A. Coercion Claims by Atheist Parents Against the Pledge of Allegiance 
1. The Newdow Trilogy 
In Newdow v. United States Congress (Newdow II),29 the Ninth 
Circuit held that a public school district’s policy of leading willing 
students in a daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including 
the words “under God,” violates the Establishment Clause.30  Newdow 
objected to the Pledge because his elementary school-aged daughter 
was “compelled to watch and listen as her state-employed teacher in 
her state-run school [led] her classmates in a ritual proclaiming that 
there is a God.”31  Newdow’s surprise victory brought the Pledge issue 
to the front pages of newspapers across the nation, sparking a public 
debate over the propriety of God in the Pledge.32  The two sides of 
this debate asserted two very different arguments against each other.  
For Newdow, it is clear that his central concern was protecting his 
elementary school-aged daughter’s still-developing beliefs.  Just as 
Christian parents typically raise their children to be Christian, and 
Jewish parents typically raise their children to be Jewish, Newdow 
repeatedly expressed a desire to raise his child as an atheist without 
the government influencing her otherwise.33  Before the Supreme 
 
 28 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592. 
 29 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 30 Id. at 490. 
 31 Id. at 483. 
 32 See, e.g., Nieves, supra note 8. 
 33 See, e.g., Original Complaint at ¶¶ 78-79, 112, 130-33, Newdow I (No. CIV S-00-
0495 MLS PAN PS); Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant Appealing District Court’s Order 
Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 3-4, 56-57, Newdow II (No. 00-16423) 
(“[I]n exercising the basic right of educating their children in the public schools—
[atheists] shouldn’t be forced to have those citizens ‘of tender years’ subjected to the 
daily indoctrination of a religious notion which is the explicit repudiation of all they 
hold true.”); Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 1, 15-16, Newdow III (No. 02-1624) 
(“For those who do not share the majority’s religious belief that there exists a God—
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Court, Newdow did not attack the Pledge on its face or the act of 
Congress in 1954 that added the words “under God,”34 but instead 
only claimed that the Pledge’s use in public schools was 
unconstitutional.35  Newdow’s primary concern was alleged coercive 
 
and who wish to instill non-Monotheistic values in their children—[the recitation of 
the Pledge in public schools] intrudes into their rights of parenthood.”). 
 34 “Under God” has not always been a part of the Pledge of Allegiance.  The 
Pledge first was written without the words “under God” in 1892 by a Baptist minister 
named Francis Bellamy, who worked as an editor at a popular family magazine called 
The Youth’s Companion.  Arthur Schlesinger Jr., When Patriotism Wasn’t Religious, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 7, 2002, 4, at 9.  The Pledge quickly became a popular part of the efforts 
of the public schools to introduce patriotism into the classroom in order to promote 
national unity after the Civil War and to “Americanize” immigrant children who were 
coming to the nation in increasing numbers at the turn of the Twentieth Century.  
MERLE CURTI, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN LOYALTY 185-86, 188-89 (1946).  By 1940, a 
majority of the states passed laws requiring the recitation of the Pledge in their 
public schools.  Charles J. Russo, The Supreme Court and the Pledge of Allegiance: Does 
God Still Have a Place in American Schools?, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 301, 303 (2004) 
(citing DAVID W. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CEASAR: THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY 
2, 4-5 (U. of Chi. Press 1962)).  Congress codified the Pledge without the words 
“under God” on June 22, 1942 “[a]s part of an overall effort to ‘codify and emphasize 
existing rules and customs pertaining to the display and use’” of the U.S. flag.  
Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2316 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Act of June 22, 
1942, Pub. L. No. 77-623, ch. 435, 56 Stat. 377, 377-80).  On June 14, 1954 Congress 
added the words “under God” to the Pledge between the word “Nation” and the 
word “indivisible.”  Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249 [hereinafter 
1954 Act]. 
 35 See Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2305; Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 
S. Ct. 384, 384 (2003) (granting certiorari on the narrow question: “Whether a 
public school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting 
the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes the words ‘under God,’ violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”); Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 3-7, 
Newdow III (No. 02-1624). 
Specifically, Newdow sought to invalidate Elk Grove school district policy AR 
6115, which reads: “Patriotic Observances, Elementary Schools: Each elementary 
school class recite [sic] the pledge of allegiance to the flag once each day.”  
Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 3, Newdow III, (No. 02-1624).  The school district’s 
policy was promulgated in order to satisfy a California statutory requirement that 
public schools conduct certain “patriotic exercises” at the beginning of each school 
day, which Newdow also challenged.  See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (West 1989) (“In 
every public elementary school each day . . .  at the beginning of the first regularly 
scheduled class . . .  there shall be conducted appropriate patriotic exercises.  The 
giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America shall 
satisfy the requirements of this section.”). 
Newdow did however, challenge the 1954 Act adding “under God” to the Pledge 
of Allegiance on its face before the Eastern District of California, see Original 
Complaint at ¶¶ 28-29, Newdow I (No. CIV S-00-0495 MLS PAN PS), and before the 
Ninth Circuit.  See Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 482.  The Ninth Circuit originally found the 
1954 Act to be facially invalid, but later amended its opinion to only strike down the 
Elk Grove Unified School District’s policy of using the Pledge in public classrooms.  
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effect of “under God” in this narrow and specific context.  He argued 
that “every school morning . . . government agents indoctrinate their 
public school students—including [my] daughter—with sectarian 
dogma.”36  While acknowledging that his daughter’s school did not 
force her to say the Pledge,37 Newdow claimed that she was 
“compelled to watch and listen” to its recitation, and that this has an 
“adverse effect . . . on the ability of atheists in general, and [Newdow] 
in particular, to raise their children free from religious governmental 
interference.”38  To further illustrate his point, Newdow stated in his 
complaint that he tested the effect the daily recitation of the Pledge 
had on his then four-year-old daughter by reciting the Pledge to her 
without the words “under God.”39  “After hearing the words ‘ . . . one 
Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all,’” Newdow claims 
that his daughter, “without a second’s pause—immediately shouted 
‘under God’! . . . recogniz[ing] that her father had ‘left out’ those 
two words.”40 
Newdow’s argument relies upon two important subjective 
factors, particular to his daughter, in explaining why merely watching 
the Pledge and listening to the phrase “under God” is coercive.  First, 
he pointed to the young “impressionable” age of the five-year-old41 
 
See Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 328 
F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 36 Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 4, Newdow III (No.  02-1624). 
 37 In West Virgina State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court held that a public 
school district may not legally compel students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance 
because it violates the students’ First Amendment right not to speak.  319 U.S. 624, 
642 (1943).  The public school may, however, ask students to recite the Pledge 
everyday as long as dissenting students are permitted to opt out.  See, e.g., WASH. REV. 
CODE § 28A.230.140 (1997) (“[A]ppropriate flag exercises [shall] be held in each 
classroom at the beginning of the school day, and in every school at the opening of 
all school assemblies, at which exercises those pupils so desiring shall recite [the 
Pledge of Allegiance].  Students not reciting the pledge shall maintain a respectful 
silence.” (emphasis added)). 
 38 Original Complaint at ¶¶ 96, 99, 130-32, Newdow I (No. CIV S-00-0495 MLS 
PAN PS). 
 39 Id. at ¶ 130.  Newdow’s daughter had yet to begin public school since she was 
only four-years-old, however she had been exposed to the Pledge on a daily basis in 
pre-school.  Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 1, 7, 15, Newdow III (No.  02-1624).  At the 
time Newdow filed his original complaint in March 2000 his daughter was five-years-
old.  Original Complaint at ¶ 76, Newdow I (No. CIV S-00-0495 MLS PAN PS).  By the 
time the case came before the United States Supreme Court in 2004, it can be 
assumed she was about nine-years-old, however, the briefs and Court opinion only 
refer to her as an elementary school student.  See Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2305. 
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girl, explaining that it would take an “amazing child” to know that 
“under God” in the Pledge is anything other than her school stating 
that God exists.42  Second, Newdow argued that this coercive power is 
particularly hard to resist for his daughter in the environment of the 
public classroom.43  In school, Newdow explained, young children 
face unique pressures to conform to their peers, and pressure to 
please their instructors due to the “didactic nature of the teacher-
student relationship.”44  During oral argument, Newdow illustrated 
his point by asking the Supreme Court45 to “[i]magine you’re the one 
atheist with 30 Christians [in the classroom] and [the teacher] say[s] 
to this child, let’s all stand up, face the flag, [and] say we are one 
nation under God.”46  Newdow then argued that even though his 
daughter is not legally required to join her teacher in reciting the 
Pledge, it is a “huge imposition to put on a small child” to ask her to 
resist the Pledge and its reference to God.47  While Newdow did make 
other constitutional arguments against the use of “under God” in the 
classroom,48 his repeated allegations that the Pledge interfered with 
his ability to inculcate his daughter with atheist beliefs shows that at 
center, Newdow was concerned that his child would be coerced into 
accepting the existence of God.49 
 
 42 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Newdow III (No. 02-1624). 
 43 Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 1, 3-7, 15-16, Newdow III (No. 02-1624). 
 44 Id. at 15. 
 45 Newdow represented himself before the Supreme Court.  See Greenhouse, 
supra note 3. 
 46 Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Newdow III (No. 02-1624). 
 47 Id. 
 48 In addition to his claim that the school district’s pledge policy violated the 
coercion test, Newdow also argued that the Pledge policy violated the Establishment 
Clause under the Lemon test, endorsement test, and neutrality requirement.  
Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 8-15, Newdow III (No. 02-1624). 
 49 See, e.g., Original Complaint at ¶¶ 78-79, 122, 130-32, Newdow I (No. CIV S-00-
0495 MLS PAN PS).  Newdow opened his Supreme Court brief declaring that “[f]or 
those who do not share the majority’s religious belief that there exists a God—and 
who wish to instill non-Monotheistic values in their children—[the recitation of the 
Pledge with “under God” in public schools] intrudes into their rights of 
parenthood.”  Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 1, Newdow III (No. 02-1624). 
Additionally, during his oral argument before the Court, Newdow repeatedly 
expressed his concern that the coercion of his daughter’s beliefs regarding God 
would interfere with his ability to teach her atheism.  See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 25-26, Newdow III (No. 02-1624) (“I am saying I as her father have a 
right to know that when she goes into the public schools she’s not going to be told 
every morning to be asked to stand up, put her hand over her heart, and say your 
father is wrong, which is what she’s told every morning.”). 
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2. Other Coercion Claims Against the Pledge 
Newdow is not the only atheist parent to claim that “under God” 
is coercive to young children in public schools.  Ten years before the 
Newdow II decision, the Seventh Circuit, in Sherman v. Community 
Consolidated School District 21,50 denied a similar claim brought by an 
atheist parent who argued that an Illinois law requiring his son’s 
elementary school to lead students in the Pledge everyday was 
unconstitutional, because it applied coercive pressure on his son to 
participate.51  The parent argued that his son was coerced, first, 
because the school’s principal “asks my son to stand with one hand 
over his heart and participate with the other pupils in reciting the 
pledge,” and second, because his son was, “hassled by other children 
on the playground because of his refusal to recite the Pledge.”52  The 
parent’s complaints echo the two context-specific factors raised by 
Newdow’s coercion claim: the pressures felt by a young child from 
peers and teachers in the public classroom.53 
One year after Newdow II, in Myers v. Loudoun County School 
Board,54 the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
dismissed another coercion claim against the Pledge.  This time the 
plaintiff father was not an atheist, but rather an Anabaptist 
Mennonite who argued that the daily recitation of the Pledge as a 
whole, not just the words “under God,” “prevent[ed] h[im] and his 
children from freely exercising their . . .  religion, which specifically 
forbids ‘worship’ of a secular state because such worship is 
‘idolatrous.’”55  Myers claimed that his children were coerced into 
straying from their religious beliefs because everyday they were 
required to sit and listen to the Pledge while everyone else in their 
classes stood around them.56  While the suit in Myers differs from 
Newdow57 and Sherman in that the plaintiff was not an atheist and did 
not attack the words “under God” in particular, the case still 
 
 50 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 51 Id. at 439-41. 
 52 Id. at 443. 
 53 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 54 251 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 55 Id. at 1264. 
 56 Id. at 1270-71. 
 57 Id. at 1276.  Although the court admitted that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Newdow II was “not squarely before it in this action,” the court made sure nonetheless 
to “specifically reject [it,] . . . find[ing] the rationale of that decision entirely 
unpersuasive.”  Id. at 1266 n.8. 
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demonstrates that even religious parents have had concerns that the 
Pledge may coerce religious beliefs that contradict their own 
teachings to their children. 
B. The Counterargument: “Under God” Does Not Endorse Religion 
1. The Newdow Trilogy 
In response to Newdow’s claim, judges, legal commentators, and 
public officials did not argue that an elementary school-age child 
would not be religiously coerced by hearing the Pledge everyday.  
Instead, they primarily advanced arguments that, in the eyes of the 
reasonable observer, the words “under God” do not endorse religion, 
but merely acknowledge the role of religion in America’s founding, 
similar to many other references to God and religion in the nation’s 
history and documents.  While the Newdow III Court did not decide 
the merits of the Pledge issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
O’Connor, and Justice Thomas did address them in separate 
concurring opinions.58  Two of these opinions,59 along with the 
questions and comments posed by the Justices at oral argument60 
indicate that at least a portion of the Court was in favor accepting this 
counterargument as an answer to Newdow’s claim. 
In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor argued that 
Newdow’s claim should have been denied because “[i]t is 
unsurprising that a Nation founded by religious refugees and 
dedicated to religious freedom should find references to divinity in 
its symbols, songs, mottoes, and oaths.  Eradicating such references 
would sever ties to a history that sustains this Nation even today.”61  
Therefore, Justice O’Connor continued, such “ceremonial deisms,” 
like “under God,” are constitutional because the reasonable observer, 
with knowledge of the “history and ubiquity” of such deisms will not 
understand the reference to be a government endorsement of 
religion.62  Only a “novel or uncommon reference[] to religion,” 
Justice O’Connor explained, “can more easily be perceived as 
 
 58 See Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2312-33. 
 59 The concurring opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor.  See 
id. at 2312-27. 
 60 See infra Part II.C for excerpts of the debate that took place between Michael 
Newdow and the Justices of the Supreme Court at oral argument. 
 61 Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2322 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 62 Id. at 2323 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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government endorsements because the reasonable observer cannot 
be presumed to be fully familiar with their origins.”63  No reasonable 
observer, the Justice concluded, sees the Pledge, with the phrase 
“under God” as a prayer—instead, the “phrase is merely descriptive; it 
purports to only identify the United States as a Nation subject to 
divine authority.”64  This argument, typical of the response to 
Newdow’s coercion argument, completely overlooks that Newdow 
never called for the outright removal of “under God” from the 
Pledge.65  Further, what a reasonable observer “fully familiar” with the 
“history and ubiquity” of the Pledge would perceive fails to consider 
what an impressionable five-year-old, who is not familiar with the 
history and ubiquity of the Pledge, would perceive. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist likewise avoided the merits of the 
coercion question by first offering a parade of examples of the use of 
the word “God” in the nation’s history—e.g., in inaugural speeches by 
former presidents and in the nation’s motto, “In God We Trust”—all 
of which have little to do with the experience of young children in 
public classrooms.66  Next, the Chief Justice purported to address 
whether the Pledge is coercive by stating: 
I do not believe that the phrase “under God” in the Pledge 
converts its recital into a “religious exercise” of the sort described 
in Lee [v. Weisman].  Instead, it is a declaration of belief in 
allegiance and loyalty to the United States flag and the Republic 
that it represents.  The phrase “under God” is in no sense a 
prayer, nor an endorsement of any religion, but a simple 
recognition of the fact [that] “[f]rom the time of our earliest 
history our peoples and our institutions have reflected the 
traditional concept that our Nation was founded on a 
fundamental belief in God.”67 
Whether Chief Justice Rehnquist is describing how he 
subjectively perceives the words “under God” in the Pledge, or how a 
reasonable person should perceive them, he—like Justice 
O’Connor—misses the critical feature of Newdow’s challenge to the 
Pledge in the first place: how a five-year-old child sitting in a public 
classroom would perceive the phrase “under God.” 
In making these arguments, Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice 
 
 63 Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 64 Id. at 2325 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 65 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 66 See Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2316-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 67 Id. at 2319-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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Rehnquist adopted the reasoning proffered by the school district 
challenged by Newdow.  In the school district’s brief, it claimed that 
“[w]hile the beginning of the Pledge is an affirmation by the person 
reciting it, . . . the speaker is not . . . indicating a belief, to the second 
half of the Pledge which reads ‘one nation under God.’”68  The 
second half of the Pledge is merely “descriptive of the historical ideals 
upon which the country was founded,” the school district claimed, 
and thus, one does not indicate a belief in this part of the statement.69  
“Under God,” and these other descriptive statements (like 
“indivisible”) are there merely “to give the persons reciting the 
Pledge an idea about the historical underpinnings of the [nation].”70  
Again, this argument takes an objective, reasonable person approach 
to avoid confronting the particular coercion issue head on, and is 
detached from the reality of whether a child in elementary school, 
watching his or her teacher and friends say the Pledge, would be able 
to make this distinction when hearing the words “under God.” 
The theme articulated by the school district was echoed time 
and again in other contexts by legal commentators71 and politicians.72  
Congressional reaction to the Ninth Circuit’s Newdow II decision was 
particularly caustic.  Republicans and Democrats alike denounced 
Newdow II as “ridiculous,” “nuts,” and “stupid.”73  Both the Senate and 
 
 68 Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 31-32, Newdow III (No. 02-1624). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 32. 
 71 See, e.g., Toobin: Pledge Ruling Likely ‘Dead on Arrival,’ CNN.com (June 27, 2002), 
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/06/27/toobin.pledge.otsc/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2005).  CNN legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin, speaking of the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision stated: 
You’ve got to put this decision in context. Our money says “In God we 
trust.” Every single day that the United States Supreme Court is in 
session the marshal begins by saying, “God save this honorable court.” 
God is not a forbidden word in the American government, and I think 
that this is an indication. If any of those nine justices, having heard 
“God save this honorable court” every single day, if something was 
wrong with it, someone might have said something. 
Id. 
 72 For example, former California Governor Gray Davis remarked after the Ninth 
Circuit refused to rehear Newdow II en banc: “At the start of every court session, the 
Supreme Court invokes God’s blessing.  So does the Senate and the House of 
Representatives.  Surely, the Supreme Court will permit schoolchildren to invoke 
God’s name while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.”  Adam Liptak, Full Appeals Court 
Lets Stand the Ban On ‘God’ in Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2003, at A1. 
 73 President George W. Bush called the ruling “ridiculous,” while then-
Democratic Senator Tom Daschle called it “nuts.”  See Nieves, supra note 8.  
Republican New York Governor George Pataki added that it was “junk justice.”  Id.  
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House of Representatives stopped their regular work to pass 
resolutions condemning Newdow II.74  Additionally, on November 13, 
2002, Congress passed a bill to reaffirm its support for the current 
language of the Pledge with “under God,”75 and to add its own 
“findings” to 4 U.S.C. § 4, where the Pledge is codified, explaining 
why the Newdow II decision was “erroneous.”76  In those findings, 
Congress offers a list of the different ways in which “God” has been 
used in American historical documents and political life, including, 
the Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, the First 
Congress’s resolution proclaiming a “National Day of Thanksgiving,” 
and the Gettysburg Address.77  Of course, schools do not ask young 
impressionable schoolchildren to profess a belief in the contents of 
any of these documents to start off each school day; nevertheless, it 
seems that Congress sought to make the point expressed by the Court 
in Lynch v. Donnelly78 that “‘[t]here is an unbroken history of official 
acknowledgement by all three branches of government of the role of 
religion in American life from at least 1789.’”79  Lynch, however, like 
the other cases cited by Congress in its bill, follows a line of Court 
reasoning that examines religious references from an objective point 
of view, failing to directly address Newdow’s coercion claim.80 
 
Other superlatives used to describe the decision were “appalling,” and “absurd,” and 
the ruling was said to have created a “constitutional crisis.”  Id.  One Senator was so 
disgusted that he called the judge who authored the decision–a thirty-three year 
veteran of the federal courts–”stupid.”  See Senators Call Pledge Decision ‘Stupid,’ 
CNN.com (June 27, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/06/26/ 
senate.resolution.pledge/index.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).  Additionally, on the 
day of the Newdow II decision, over one hundred members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives gathered on the steps of the Capitol to recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance in unison to protest the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.  Id. 
 74 S. Res. 292, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. S6105 (2002) (enacted); H.R. Res. 
459, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. H4135 (2002) (enacted).  See also Lawmakers Blast 
Pledge Ruling, CNN.com (June 27, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/ 
06/26/ pledge.allegiance/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2005) (noting that the 
Senate resolution passed 99-0). 
 75 Act of Nov. 13, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-293, § 2, 116 Stat. 2057, 2060 (codified as 
amended at 4 U.S.C. § 4). 
 76 Id. § 1, 116 Stat. at 2058-60. 
 77 Id. 
 78 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 79 See § 1, 116 Stat. at 2057 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 654 
(1984)). 
 80 See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the endorsement test. 
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2. Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor’s response to 
Newdow’s coercion claim mirrored the Seventh Circuit’s rebuttal to 
an identical claim presented in Sherman.  Rather than apply the 
coercion test or the Lemon test,81 Judge Easterbrook opted for a “more 
direct” approach.82  First, the judge listed the multiple ways in which 
the nation’s leaders—from the founders to contemporary 
presidents—have referenced God.83  Judge Easterbrook then equated 
the Pledge with the Declaration of Independence, which also 
contains references to a higher being,84 and distinguished such 
“patriotic or ceremonial occasions” from prayers, which are 
“unquestioned religious exercises.”85  The judge made this evaluation 
through the eyes of the reasonable observer; as support for his 
Pledge-prayer distinction, he quoted an opinion by Justice O’Connor 
stating that “‘government acknowledgements of religion,’” due to 
their “‘history and ubiquity, . . . are not understood as conveying 
approval of particular religious beliefs.’”86  Relying on this reasoning 
and other Supreme Court dicta, the Seventh Circuit rejected 
Sherman’s coercion claim against “under God.”87 
In sum, the debate over the use of “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance, which culminated with Newdow III, can be characterized 
by two contrasting arguments.  Newdow’s coercion argument sees the 
Pledge and the words “under God” through the eyes of a five-year-
old.  Opponents counter with an argument that sees the Pledge from 
an objective viewpoint, stressing the benign role of such religious 
references in describing the nation’s history. 
 
 81 To survive the Lemon test, a government action must have (1) a secular 
purpose, (2) a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, 
and (3) must not create an excessive entanglement with religion.  Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
 82 Sherman, 980 F.2d at 445. 
 83 Id. at 445-46. 
 84 The Declaration of Independence uses the words “God,” and “Creator.”  THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1-2 (U.S. 1776). 
 85 Id. at 446-47. 
 86 Id. at 447 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 87 Id. at 448. 
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ESTABLISHMENT              
CLAUSE’S COERCION AND ENDORSEMENT TESTS,                                       
AND ITS EFFECT ON THE PLEDGE DEBATE 
The reason why Pledge proponents are able to escape directly 
confronting whether the daily recitation of “under God” is coercive to 
an elementary school student lies in the “erratic and unprincipled” 
state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.88  Since the early 1970s, 
the Court has developed and applied three Establishment Clause 
tests: the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test.89  
Depending on the type of Establishment Clause case before the 
Court, it might choose to apply one test over another,90 or to apply all 
three tests.91  Very generally, the Establishment Clause is violated 
under the endorsement test (which essentially incorporated the 
Lemon test92) when a reasonable observer would view government 
action as sending a message that it favors one religion over another, 
or religion over irreligion.93  The coercion test sets the bar for an 
 
 88 LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 154, 220-21 (2d ed. 1994).  See also Kevin E. Broyles & James Matthew 
Henderson, Sr., How Much God in the Schools?: Religious Freedom and the First Self-Evident 
Truth: Equality as a Guiding Principle in Interpreting the Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 351, 353 (1995) (“[T]he Court’s religious freedom cases are often 
logically incomprehensible, its First Amendment jurisprudence irreconcilable from 
one case to the next.”). 
 89 DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 113 (2003). 
 90 See, e.g., Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2321 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“As I have 
said before, the Establishment Clause ‘cannot easily be reduced to a single test.  There 
are different categories of Establishment Clause cases, which may call for different 
approaches.’”) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 
U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 91 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301-17 (2000) 
(applying the Lemon, endorsement and coercion tests to invalidate a school-
sponsored prayer prior to high school football games). 
 92 The endorsement test was developed by Justice O’Connor as a “clarification” of 
the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the Lemon test.  Lynch, 465 U.S. 
at 687-94 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  While at times the Court omits the Lemon test 
language when applying the endorsement test to detect Establishment Clause 
violations, see, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 
(O’Connor, J., concurring), commentators have said that the endorsement test is 
“fully consistent” with the Lemon test, see Daniel O. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 865, 874 (1993) [hereinafter, Conkle, Lemon], and indeed, is often 
applied by the Court as a measure of whether government action violates Lemon’s 
“effect prong.”  See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301-10; Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993); Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. 
Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249-53 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
 93 See e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  To violate 
the endorsement test a government action must “have the effect of communicating a 
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Establishment Clause violation higher, and only strikes down state 
action that is taken to indoctrinate and coerce religious participation 
and beliefs.94 
A. Coercion and the Establishment Clause 
Lee v. Weisman is an obvious source of support for an atheist 
parent’s claim that “under God” exerts coercive pressure on his child 
attending public school.  In that case, the Court stuck down a school 
district’s practice of allowing the recitation of a nonsectarian 
invocation by a religious figure at its middle school graduation 
ceremony.95  The coercion test is the newest of the Court’s 
Establishment Clause tests, but for years prior to Lee, the coercion 
rationale lingered in the background of the Court’s line of “school 
prayer” cases, where it has consistently invalidated other uses of 
religion in the public classroom. 
1. Establishment Clause Coercion Pre-Lee v. Weisman: The 
School Prayer Cases 
The Supreme Court has a long history of rejecting school-
sponsored religious instruction and prayer in public schools. 96  Many 
of these cases were decided before the formulation of specific 
Establishment Clause tests, but for the most part their reasoning 
relies upon the first prong of the three-part Lemon test, which “forbids 
the government, including the public schools, from acting with the 
purpose of advancing or endorsing either one religion over others or 
religion over irreligion.”97  While not forming the basis of the Court’s 
decisions, the issue of coercion has been often discussed as a 
supporting rationale for striking down classroom religion.  Three 
 
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion,” to a “reasonable 
observer” who is “deemed aware of the history and context of the community and the 
forum in which the religious [speech takes place].” Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780.  For 
example, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627-28 (1989), Justice 
O’Connor concurred in the Court’s decision striking down the display of a crèche in 
a county government building, finding the display objectionable not because it 
threatened to coerce Christian belief into anyone, but merely because the display 
“‘convey[ed] a message ‘that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or 
preferred.’”  See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE 1151 (2d ed. 2002). 
 94 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 591-92. 
 95 Id. at 581-86. 
 96 See CONKLE, supra note 89, at 147. 
 97 Id. 
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examples are particularly instructive. 
In McCollum v. Board of Education,98 the Court addressed religion 
in the public schools for the first time and struck down a program 
that allowed private religious instructors to use public school facilities 
to teach students religious dogma during school hours.99  The Court 
ultimately found the program in violation of the Establishment 
Clause because providing “tax-supported public school buildings . . . 
for the dissemination of religious doctrines,” purposely aids 
religion.100  Justice Black’s majority opinion also acknowledged the 
religiously coercive threat the program posed, stressing that “[t]he 
preservation of the community from . . . coercion however subtly 
exercised, requires strict confinement of the State to instruction 
other than religious, leaving to the individual’s church and home, 
indoctrination in the faith of his choice.”101 Likewise, Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion added that the voluntary nature of 
the program was constitutionally irrelevant because 
[t]hat a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; 
it does not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in 
matters sacred to conscience and outside the school’s domain.  
The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an 
outstanding characteristic of children.  The result is an obvious 
pressure upon children to attend.102 
Similarly, in Engel v. Vitale103 the Court used the Establishment 
Clause to invalidate a public school district’s requirement that a 
nondenominational prayer be recited daily in its classrooms.104  Again, 
Justice Black stressed that religious coercion was a factor, but not 
essential to the Court’s decision: 
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does 
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental 
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which 
establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to 
coerce nonobserving individuals or not.  This is not to say, of 
 
 98 333 U.S. 203. 
 99 Id. at 205. 
 100 Id. at 212.  Professor Conkle describes this holding as implementing what 
would later become the Lemon and endorsement test’s first prong.  See CONKLE, supra 
note 89, at 150. 
 101 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 217. 
 102 Id. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 103 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 104 Id. at 422. 
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course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form of 
religious worship do not involve coercion of such individuals.  
When the power, prestige and financial support of government is 
placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive 
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing 
officially approved religion is plain.  But the purposes underlying 
the Establishment Clause go much further than that.105 
It was enough for the Court that the school district’s prayer was 
merely “composed by government officials as part of a governmental 
program to further religious beliefs”106 in order to find it 
unconstitutional; however, its concern with coercion was obvious.   
Finally, in Wallace v. Jaffree,107 the Supreme Court overturned an 
Alabama law allowing public schools to set aside one minute each day 
“for meditation or voluntary prayer.”108  The plaintiff claimed that his 
two daughters (one in kindergarten, the other in second grade) were 
being coerced into praying during the minute of silence due to the 
“ostracism [they faced] from their peer group class members if they 
did not participate.”109  The Court held that the moment of silence 
violated the Lemon test’s first prong since it was “entirely motivated by 
a purpose to advance religion.”110  Justice Stevens’s majority opinion, 
however, did acknowledge the parent’s fears of religious coercion, 
pointing out that, “[t]he individual’s freedom to choose his own 
creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the 
creed established by the majority.”111 
2. Lee v. Weisman: Coercion Takes Center Stage 
After years of being relegated to dicta in the Court’s 
Establishment Clause holdings, coercion finally took center stage in 
1992, when in Lee v. Weisman112 the Court relied upon the rationale to 
invalidate a public school district’s practice of inviting a religious 
figure to deliver a nonsectarian invocation to students at its middle 
school graduation ceremony.113  Justice Kennedy, invoking Engel, 
 
 105 Id. at 430-31. 
 106 Id. at 425. 
 107 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 108 Id. at 41-42. 
 109 Id. at 42. 
 110 Id. at 56. 
 111 Id. at 52. 
 112 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 113 Id. at 581-86. 
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among other cases, explained that there are “heightened concerns 
with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure 
in the elementary and secondary public schools,” and that “[a] state-
created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and 
conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, 
not imposed.”114 The Court’s opinion abandoned an objective 
reasonable person point of view and indicated that the “risk of 
indirect coercion” is to be measured from the point of view of the 
young student in the public school context: “What to most believers 
may seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the 
nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school context may 
appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ 
the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.”115  Even 
though some people may not feel injured by standing for the prayer 
merely out of respect for others’ beliefs, Justice Kennedy explained 
that “for the dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable 
perception that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner 
her conscience will not allow, the injury is no less real.”116  The prayer 
was coercive in this context, Justice Kennedy stressed, because the 
plaintiff was forced to make an impermissible choice between either 
participating in the offensive religious activity or protesting against it.  
While “mature adults” may be able to withstand the coercive force of 
such a dilemma, Justice Kennedy stated, “the State may not, 
consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary 
school children in this position.”117 
The Lee Court’s reliance on this coercion rationale did not 
repudiate the Lemon test (which is more protective of religious 
liberty) or formally adopt a coercion test for all Establishment Clause 
 
 114 Id. at 592. 
 115 Id. at 592 (emphasis added). 
 116 Id. at 593 (emphasis added).  Justice Kennedy continued, explaining that “a 
reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group exercise signified her 
own participation or approval of it.”  Id.  Even though Justice Kennedy uses the 
“reasonable” language, similar to Justice O’Connor’s endorsement standard, it is 
clear that the Justice is still speaking of a schoolchild, of young age and in the 
pressurized environment of the public school, not Justice O’Connor’s objective 
reasonable person aware of the “history and ubiquity” of the Pledge. 
 117 Id. at 593 (emphasis added).  Justice Kennedy cited “research in psychology” to 
confirm the “common assumption that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure 
from their peers towards conformity, [especially] in matters of social convention.”  
Id. at 593-94; see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (noting the 
difference between adults who are mentally equipped to withstand “religious 
indoctrination” and children more likely to be affected by “peer pressure”). 
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cases.118  Instead, the Court carefully explained that “at a minimum, 
the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone 
to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”119  Thus, the 
Court preserved the principle, expressed in the preceding school 
prayer cases, that a finding of coercion is sufficient, but not necessary, 
for a violation of the Establishment Clause.120  Unlike McCollum, Engel, 
Wallace, and the other school prayer cases, however, coercion was the 
main rationale for the decision in Lee.  This most likely occurred as 
the result of a compromise formed between Justice Kennedy and 
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor and Souter in order to create a 
majority in favor of invalidating the prayer.121  The school district and 
the (first) Bush Administration as amicus curiae urged the Lee Court to 
formally abandon the Lemon test and to find the graduation prayer 
constitutional under the theory that no one in the audience was 
coerced into religious conformity by the prayer.122  Initially, the Court 
appeared as if it would take this advice.  Justice Kennedy and the 
Rehnquist-Scalia wing of the Court support the adoption of a 
coercion-based standard as the sole measure of an Establishment 
Clause violation, because it would give the government breathing 
room to accommodate the virtues of religious belief in public life.123  
The Chief Justice originally assigned Justice Kennedy to write a 5-4 
majority opinion upholding the prayer in Lee; however, a change of 
heart several months later caused Justice Kennedy to defect and join 
the four Justices in favor of invalidating the prayer.124  That change of 
heart, though, did not include abandoning his affinity for the 
coercion test.  While the other four members of the Lee majority 
 
 118 See LEVY, supra note 88, at 200-01. 
 119 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (emphasis added). 
 120 CONKLE, supra note 89, at 124; see generally Conkle, Lemon, supra note 92, at 865. 
 121 Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor and Souter joined in Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion.  Justices Blackmun and Souter authored concurring opinions in 
which Justices O’Connor and Stevens both joined.  Lee, 505 U.S. 599-631. 
 122 Douglas Laycock, “Noncoercive” Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the 
Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37, 39, 53-54 (1991) [hereinafter Laycock, 
Noncoercive]. 
 123 LEVY, supra note 88, at 159. 
 124 Linda Greenhouse, The Blackmun Papers: Documents Reveal the Evolution of a 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 2004, at A1.  The personal letters and memoranda of 
Justice Blackmun from his time on the Court were released five years after his death 
in 2004 by the Library of Congress.  Justice Kennedy’s Lee v. Weisman defection was 
“[o]ne of the surprises in the papers” and revealed “that after several months” of 
pondering his initial opinion upholding the prayers, Justice Kennedy thought it 
“‘looked quite wrong.’”  Id. 
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preferred to strike down the prayer using the endorsement test, 
Justice Kennedy preserved his personal opposition to that standard by 
writing a majority opinion declaring the prayers unconstitutional for 
being coercive, and “[a]s the swing man in the case, [he] apparently 
had his way with the other members of the majority who would have 
been on the losing side had they not capitulated to his views.”125  So 
while the other members of the Lee majority signed on to Justice 
Kennedy’s coercion rationale, they were sure to make clear in two 
concurring opinions that a breach of Lemon’s lower endorsement 
threshold is still sufficient to violate the Establishment Clause.126  
Thus, Lee does not represent a break with the “coercion is sufficient, 
but not necessary” rationale of the school prayer cases that came 
before it, but nevertheless, its use of coercion as its deciding rationale 
has affected Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Now, a “coercion 
test” is often seen as a third analytical option for the Court and 
litigants to use alongside the Lemon and endorsement tests.127 
In sum, Lee provides an attractive precedent for an atheist parent 
concerned over the possible coercion of his child’s religious beliefs 
arising from the daily repetition of the words “under God,” and 
explains why such a parent would make the Establishment Clause the 
main thrust of his or her attack.  Indeed, this was the main approach 
taken by both Newdow and Sherman in their suits against the Pledge. 
B. Endorsement and the Establishment Clause 
Rather than respond directly to a coercion claim based upon Lee 
v. Weisman, school districts and other supporters of “under God” in 
the Pledge have proffered an alternative framework in the 
endorsement test.  The endorsement test was born with Justice 
O’Connor’s “clarification” of the Lemon test in her concurring 
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.128  To survive the Lemon test, a 
government action must have (1) a secular purpose, (2) a principal 
or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) 
 
 125 LEVY, supra note 88, at 202. 
 126 Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion with Justices Stevens and 
O’Connor joining.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 599-609.  Justice Souter also wrote a 
concurring opinion, also with Justices Stevens and O’Connor joining.  See id. at 609-
31. 
 127 CONKLE, supra note 89, at 124.  See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 310-13 (applying 
the coercion test alongside the endorsement test and Lemon test). 
 128 465 U.S. at 687-94 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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must not create an excessive entanglement with religion.129  The 
endorsement test essentially dropped Lemon’s third prong and 
evaluates prongs one and two from the perspective of a reasonable 
person.130  More specifically, prong one asks “whether the 
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or 
disapproval of religion,” and prong two asks whether government 
action “ha[s] the effect of communicating a message of government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion,”131 to a “reasonable 
observer . . . deemed aware of the history and context of the 
community and the forum in which the religious [speech takes 
place].”132  Such a message of endorsement violates the Establishment 
Clause, Justice O’Connor explained, because it makes religion 
relevant “to a person’s standing in the political community,” by 
declaring to “nonadherents that they are outsiders,” and to 
“adherents that they are insiders”133— regardless of whether anyone’s 
beliefs or actions are coerced by the religious speech.  In Lynch, a 
government-owned crèche displayed on public grounds in the 
context of a secular Christmas holiday display was held not to violate 
Lemon’s second prong.134  Justice O’Connor, concurring, explained 
that although the religious content of the crèche was not removed by 
its secular surroundings, the context of the display negated a message 
of endorsement of that content.135  Thus, a reasonable observer would 
not understand the crèche to be an endorsement of religion, but 
rather, part of a display celebrating a public holiday.136  Conversely, in 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU,137 the Court held that a similar 
government-owned nativity scene standing alone on the main steps of a 
county courthouse conveyed an impermissible message of 
endorsement to a reasonable observer, because “unlike in Lynch, 
nothing in the context of the display detracts from the crèche’s 
 
 129 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
 130 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-92 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 131 Id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 132 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780  (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor 
explained that the reasonable observer of the endorsement test “is similar to the 
‘reasonable person’ in tort law,” who is “a personification of  a community ideal of a 
reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective] social judgment.”  Id. at 779-80 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted). 
 133 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 134 Id. at 671, 681-83. 
 135 Id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 136 Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 137 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
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religious message.”138 
Thus, under the endorsement test, a court evaluating 
government religious speech must do so from the perspective of the 
reasonable observer “deemed aware of the history of the conduct in 
question, and . . . understand[ing of] its place in our Nation’s 
cultural landscape.”139 
C. Coercion versus Endorsement in the Pledge Debate: An Illustration 
The contrast between the perspectives of the coercion test and 
endorsement test arguments in the Pledge of Allegiance debate was 
nowhere better demonstrated than in Newdow’s oral argument 
before the United States Supreme Court in Newdow III.  Newdow tried 
numerous times to stress that the use of “under God” in the Pledge is 
only unconstitutional in the public school context because of the 
influence it wields over impressionable students like his daughter.  
The Court’s consistent reply to Newdow was that the words “under 
God” do not make the Pledge a prayer in the eyes of a reasonable 
observer, and declined to address how a five-year-old might perceive 
the Pledge.  The discourse went as follows: 
MR. NEWDOW: . . . I am saying I as her father have a right to 
know that when she goes into the public schools she’s not going 
to be told every morning to be asked to stand up, put her hand 
over her heart, and say your father is wrong, which is what she’s 
told every morning. . . . 
QUESTION:140 Well, she does have a right not to participate. 
MR. NEWDOW: She has a—yes, except under Lee v. Weisman 
she’s clearly coerced to participate.  If there was coercion in Lee 
v. Weisman — 
QUESTION: That was a prayer. 
MR. NEWDOW: Well, I’m not sure that this isn’t a prayer, and 
I’m—I am sure that the Establishment Clause does not require 
prayer. . . . 
QUESTION: Yeah, but I suppose reasonable people could look at 
the pledge as not constituting a prayer. . . .  [The Pledge] 
 
 138 Id. at 598-602. 
 139 Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2323 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Pinette, 515 
U.S. at 781 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 140 Unfortunately, the oral argument transcripts provided by the United States 
Supreme Court on its website, http://www.supremecourtus.gov, do not specify the 
name of the Justice asking each question. 
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certainly doesn’t sound like anything like a prayer. 
MR. NEWDOW: Not at all. 
QUESTION: Then why isn’t [the] categorization of the 
remainder [of the Pledge] as descriptive, one nation under God, 
with liberty and justice for all [valid]? . . . 
MR. NEWDOW: . . . It says under God.  That’s as purely religious 
as you can get and I think it would be an amazing child to 
suddenly come up with this knowledge of the history of our 
society and—what our nation was founded on.141 
Later in the argument, a Justice of the Court used the familiar 
tactic of comparing “under God” to other public uses of religion that 
bear no relation to daily repetition in a public elementary school 
classroom: 
QUESTION: Of course, we have — we have so many references to 
God in our daily lives in this country.  We opened this session of 
the Court today — . . . with a reference and I suppose you would 
find that invalid as well. 
MR. NEWDOW: . . . No one — when this Court opens, God save 
this honorable Court, nobody’s asked to stand up, place their 
hand on their heart and affirm this belief. . . . 
QUESTION: And you have no problem with, in God we trust, on 
the coins and that sort of thing? 
MR. NEWDOW: If my child was asked to stand up and say, in God 
we trust, every morning the public schools led by her teachers — 
QUESTION: It’s alright for her to have the coins and use them 
and read them, but it’s — it’s the — the problem of being asked 
to say the pledge? 
MR. NEWDOW: Well, first of all, under Lee v. Weisman, she is 
coerced in — 
. . . 
QUESTION: That was a prayer.142 
But was it a prayer to the five-year-old?  This question is never 
addressed—and with good reason.  As demonstrated in Part III.A, 
under Lee v. Weisman the daily recitation of the Pledge with the words 
“under God” in public school classrooms violates a child’s 
Constitutional right to freedom of religious conscience.   
 
 141 Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-27, Newdow III (No. 02-1624). 
 142 Id. at 30-31. 
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III. ENDORSEMENT: PROVIDING AN ESCAPE-HATCH FROM           
APPLYING LEE V. WEISMAN’S COERCION TEST TO “UNDER GOD”                
IN THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE 
When the reasoning of Lee v. Weisman is applied to the daily 
recitation of the Pledge with “under God” in the public classroom, 
the conclusion that the practice violates the constitution is 
unavoidable.  Therefore, to avoid this result, one must escape from 
applying the coercion test in the first place.  Two different arguments 
were taking place in the Pledge debate because the endorsement test 
provides this escape by offering supporters of “under God” a way to 
uphold the Pledge while avoiding an honest application of Lee. 
A. Lee v. Weisman Applied to “under God” in the Pledge 
Angered by the majority decision in Lee, Justice Scalia wrote a 
prescient dissent, decrying what he felt would be the absurd result 
dictated by the Court’s reasoning: the unconstitutionality of the 
Pledge of Allegiance.143  Justice Scalia pointed out that the religious 
invocation struck down in Lee was immediately preceded during the 
graduation ceremony by the Pledge, for which the students also 
stood.144  He then warned that since the Pledge 
include[s] the phrase “under God,” recital of the Pledge would 
appear to raise the same Establishment Clause issue as the 
invocation and benediction.  If students were psychologically 
coerced to remain standing during the invocation, they must also 
have been psychologically coerced, moments before, to stand for 
(and thereby, in the Court’s view, take part in or appear to take 
part in) the Pledge.  Must the Pledge therefore be barred from 
the public schools (both from graduation ceremonies and from 
the classroom)?145 
According to the Ninth Circuit, which faithfully applied Lee in 
Newdow II, the answer to Justice Scalia’s hypothetical is yes.  The 
Ninth Circuit first rejected in the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
Sherman146 upholding “under God,” because Judge Easterbrook failed 
to apply Lee’s coercion test in that case.147  The Ninth Circuit 
 
 143 Lee, 505 U.S. at 638-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 144 Id. at 583 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 145 Id. at 638-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 146 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992).  See supra Part I.A.2 and I.B.2 for a brief 
discussion of Sherman. 
 147 Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 489-90. 
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maintained that reciting the Pledge requires the speaker to declare a 
belief in monotheism, thus rejecting the argument that the Pledge is 
merely a historical recognition that the founders believed in God.148  
Further, this profession of belief cannot be religiously-neutral, the 
court of appeals averred, because “[a] profession that we are nation 
‘under God’ is identical, for Establishment Clause purposes, to a 
profession that we are a nation ‘under Jesus,’ a nation ‘under 
Vishnu,’ a nation ‘under Zeus,’ or a nation ‘under no god.’”149  The 
Ninth Circuit then noted Lee’s heightened concerns with coercive 
pressures in the public classroom, and stated that similarly here, the 
school district’s policy of daily recitation of the Pledge, even though 
voluntary, “places students in the untenable position of choosing 
between participating in an exercise with religious content or 
protesting.”150 
Another compelling case that Lee mandates the removal of 
“under God” from the public classroom was made, ironically, by 
Justice Thomas (a staunch accomodationalist) in his concurring 
opinion in Newdow III.151  After first making it clear that he believes 
Lee was “wrongly decided,” Justice Thomas nevertheless argued that 
as a matter of precedent, “under God” in the classroom is invalid post 
Lee.152  Significantly, Justice Thomas confronted the actual context-
specific facts of Newdow’s case when conducting his analysis, and 
examined the Pledge from the viewpoint of an elementary school-
aged child.  He first pointed out that Lee’s graduation prayer was a 
one-time event before older teenagers with their parents nearby, as 
opposed to Newdow, where the Pledge is recited daily to “very young 
students, removed from the protection of their parents.”153 
Second, while the students in Lee could choose whether to 
attend their graduation ceremony where the prayer took place 
(although they may be coerced to go by peer pressure), Justice 
Thomas stressed that students are legally required to attend school, 
where the Pledge is delivered.154 
 
 148 Id. at 487 (“To recite the Pledge is not to describe the United States; instead it 
is to swear allegiance to the values for which the flag stands: unity, indivisibility, 
liberty, justice, and – since 1954 – monotheism.”). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 488. 
 151 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2327 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 152 Id. at 2330 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 153 Id. at 2328 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 154 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Third, the Justice explained that the dissenting students in Lee 
would, at worst, have been coerced into standing for the graduation 
invocation, and thus would only appear to be participating in the 
prayer.  In contrast, Newdow’s young child would actually be coerced 
into saying the Pledge and reciting the words “under God.”155  
Additionally, Justice Thomas pointed out that the coercive strength 
of the peer pressure to participate in the classroom Pledge is 
especially great because “failure to do so [would be] immediately 
obvious to one’s peers.”156 
Fourth, Justice Thomas argued that “[i]t is difficult to see how” 
stating that the United States is “‘one Nation under God,’ . . . does 
not entail an affirmation that God exists.”157  Refuting Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s assertion that “under God” is merely descriptive and does 
not constitute an affirmation of religious belief (and thus is not 
coercive),158 Justice Thomas pointed out that the Court already 
explicitly stated in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette159 
that reciting the Pledge “‘require[d] affirmation of a belief and an 
attitude of mind . . . .’”160  In agreement with Justice Thomas is 
Professor Douglas Laycock, who has maintained that the argument 
that “‘under God’ is not a religious statement” is simply “phony.”161  
He points out that the existence of God is the foundation of theistic 
faiths, and that the members of Congress who added “under God” to 
the Pledge were not coy about their intentions.162 
Indeed, Congress decided to add “under God” to the Pledge 
during the height of the Cold War and in response to fear from the 
threat posed by “godless communism.”163  The event that hastened 
 
 155 Id. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 156 Id. at 2329 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 157 Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 158 The argument that the Pledge is devoid of religious content has been 
employed often to rebut the Ninth Circuit’s decision.  See, e.g., Petitioners’ Brief on 
the Merits at 30, Newdow III (No. 02-1624); Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 472 (O’Scannlain, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he Pledge of  Allegiance is simply not a ‘religious act.’”). 
 159 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 160 Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Barnette, 319 
U.S. at 631). 
 161 Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious 
Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 162 (2004). 
 162 Id. at 224.  On June 14, 1954 Congress added the words “under God” to the 
Pledge between the word “Nation” and the word “indivisible.”  68 Stat. at 249. 
 163 See RELIGION AND THE COLD WAR (Dianne Kirby ed., 2002).  See also 100 CONG. 
REC. H1700 (1954) (“The unbridgeable gap between America and Communist 
Russia is a belief in Almighty God.”) (statement of Rep. Rabaut).  Adding “under 
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the addition to the Pledge was a sermon given by the Reverend 
George Docherty in Washington, D.C.’s New York Avenue 
Presbyterian Church in February 1954.164  With President Eisenhower 
in attendance, Reverend Docherty argued from the pulpit that 
without a reference to God, one could “hear little Muscovites repeat a 
similar pledge to their hammer-and-sickle flag in Moscow with equal 
solemnity . . . .”165  Reverend Docherty’s sermon was so effective that 
seventeen bills were subsequently submitted in Congress proposing to 
add “under God” to the Pledge.166  One Senator who helped pass the 
act exclaimed, “What better training for our youngsters could there 
be than to have them, each time they pledge allegiance to Old Glory, 
reassert their belief, like that of their fathers and their fathers before 
them, in the all-present, all-knowing, all-seeing, all-powerful 
Creator.”167  Additionally, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
signed the act adding “under God”, he declared that 
[f]rom this day forward the millions of our school children will 
daily proclaim . . . the dedication of our Nation and our people to 
the Almighty.  [N]othing could be more inspiring than to 
contemplate this rededication of our youth on each school 
morning, to our country’s true meaning . . . .  Over the globe, . . . 
millions [have been] deadened in mind and soul by a 
materialistic philosophy of life . . . .  In this way, we are 
reaffirming the transcendence of religious faith in America’s 
heritage and future . . . .168 
In light of this historical background, it is plain that “under God” was 
added to the Pledge for the very reason that it has religious content.  
 
God” to the Pledge was first suggested by the Knights of Columbus, a Catholic 
organization, which in 1951 added “under God” to its own recitation of the Pledge at 
Knights meetings.  CHRISTOPHER KAUFFMAN, FAITH AND FRATERNALISM: THE HISTORY 
OF THE KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS 1882-1982, at 385 (1982). 
 164 Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2083, 2118 (1996). 
 165 Id. at 2118-19 (citations omitted). 
 166 Id. at 2119 (citations omitted). 
 167 100 CONG. REC. H5915 (1954).  Additionally, Representative Louis Rabaut, the 
House sponsor of the Act, stated that “the children of our land, in the daily recitation 
of the pledge in school, will be daily impressed with a true understanding of our way 
of life and its origins.”  See 2 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2341.  Senator Homer Ferguson, the 
Senate sponsor of the bill, stressed that with the new Pledge and “under God” it was 
important to “remind the . . . young people of America, who take the pledge of 
allegiance to the flag more often than do adults, that it is not only a pledge of words 
but also of belief.”  100 CONG. REC. H6348 (1954). 
 168 100 CONG. REC. H8617 (1954). 
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Claims to the contrary seem disingenuous at best. 
As mentioned by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court has 
previously addressed the nature of the language of the Pledge of 
Allegiance.  In holding that public schools cannot force students to 
recite the Pledge, the Barnette Court explained that its words are 
normative and ideological, and rejected a school district’s similar 
claim that the second half of the Pledge is merely descriptive.169  If 
“the phrase ‘liberty and justice for all,’ . . . must be accepted as 
descriptive of the present order rather than an ideal,” the Court said, 
it “might to some seem an overstatement.”170  Barnette was decided 
before the 1954 addition of “under God” to the Pledge, but today 
those two words are contained in the same “second half” of the 
Pledge as “liberty and justice for all,”—the same second half  that the 
current Chief Justice and others now claim to be descriptive, despite 
Barnette’s clear holding otherwise. 
In addition to being contrary to the intentions of Congress and 
the Court’s reasoning in Barnette, the argument that pledging to a 
“nation, under God” does not affirm a belief in God is contrary to the 
logical, generally accepted meaning of the text.  At the very least, to 
state that the United States is “one Nation under God” implicitly 
accepts that there is a god to be under in the first place.  This 
common sense notion was even acknowledged by President George 
W. Bush who once explained that, “[w]hen we pledge allegiance to 
One Nation under God, our citizens participate in an important 
American tradition of humbly seeking the wisdom and blessing of 
Divine Providence.”171 
Even accepting for the sake of argument that, in the eyes of a 
reasonable observer, reciting “one Nation, under God” does not 
require a profession of belief that God exists, it is unrealistic to 
believe that a five-year-old child would perceive it this way. 172  Indeed, 
studies in child psychology have shown that many children confuse 
the Pledge of Allegiance with a prayer because “God” is one of the 
few terms they immediately recognize.173 
 
 169 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633-34. 
 170 Id. at 634 n.14. 
 171 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, et al. in Support of Affirmance at 27, Newdow III (No. 02-1624), citing a letter 
by President George W. Bush to an “American Buddhist leader.” 
 172 Id. at 11-13. 
 173 Id. at 13 (citing ROBERT D. HESS & JUDITH V. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN 105 (1967); Carol Seefeldt, “I Pledge . . .”, 
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Finally, in his Newdow III concurrence, Justice Thomas countered 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s claim that since the Pledge is not a “prayer” 
it cannot fail the coercion test.  While conceding that the Pledge is 
not a prayer, Justice Thomas reminded the Court that it has rejected 
past attempts to make distinctions between prayer and other forms of 
speech containing religious messages,174 and has stated that under the 
Free Exercise Clause “the government cannot require a person to 
‘declare his belief in God.’”175 
In addition to Justice Thomas’ criticisms, the “Pledge is not a 
Prayer” argument ignores that the Court has never stated that only a 
prayer can violate the coercion test or the Establishment Clause.  The 
explicit concern of Lee’s coercion test is protecting freedom of “belief 
and conscience.”176  While this concern has most often arisen in the 
context of state mandated prayers in public schools,177 this has not 
always been the case.  For example, in Stone v. Graham178 the Court 
held that the Establishment Clause prevents a public school from 
posting the Ten Commandments in a classroom because its effect 
would be “to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, 
perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments.”179  Even though 
a prayer was not involved, the Court still recognized the coercive 
propensity of public school-sponsored religion.  That freedom of 
conscience is somehow threatened by a prayer, but not other forms of 
school-sponsored religion, is simply an illogical distinction that 
ignores Court precedent. 
Moreover, although the Pledge does not formally speak to God, 
its substance is similar to that of the coercive invocation struck down in 
Lee.  While the invocation was certainly a prayer in form because it 
 
CHILDHOOD EDUC. 308 (May/June 1982) (stating that “‘[c]hildren reveal [various] 
misconceptions about the Pledge.  ‘Well, I think it’s like a prayer to God,’ explains 
one girl.’” (second alteration in original)). 
 174 Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 n.6 (1981) (stating that an alleged distinction between 
worship and religious speech lacks “intelligible content”)). 
 175 Id. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 
489 (1961)). 
 176 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (“A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom 
of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not 
imposed.”) (emphasis added). 
 177 See e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. 421.  See also supra Part II.A.1 for a brief discussion of 
Engel and its holding. 
 178 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
 179 Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
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was addressed to God, the substance of the prayer also contained 
many secular messages; it thanked God for “America, where diversity 
is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected . . . ,” and “for 
[America’s] court system where all may seek justice.”180  Additionally, 
the Lee prayer thanked God for giving the students the “[c]apacity for 
learning,” and for the achievement and “important milestone” of 
graduation.181  Likewise, the substance of the Pledge of Allegiance 
contains a similar mix of secular and religious statements.  The 
Pledge heralds the secular virtues of our nation, such as “liberty, and 
justice for all,” while describing a relationship in which those qualities 
are subservient to God with the statement, “one nation under God.”  
Thus, the substance of both the invalid prayer in Lee and the Pledge 
illustrate a structure where secular qualities exist by virtue of God.182  
The only difference is that a prayer is addressed to God in order to 
give thanks for these secular qualities.  For the purposes of coercing 
the religious beliefs of a five-year-old, the characterization of the 
former as a coercive “prayer” and the latter as a noncoercive “secular 
statement of patriotism” is mere semantics.  As Justice Thomas stated, 
the Court has rejected past attempts to make distinctions between 
worship and other religious speech.183  If the Pledge is perceived as no 
different than a prayer in the eyes of a five-year-old, then it makes 
little difference that to a reasonable observer the words “under God” 
are patriotic, not religious, and descriptive, not normative.  The 
child’s freedom of conscience—the main concern of Lee—is still 
threatened. 
In sum, as long as Lee v. Weisman and its coercion test remain 
good law, Newdow’s claim that the daily repetition of the Pledge, with 
“under God,” in the public classroom is unconstitutional should be 
upheld.  Although Justice Thomas has personally repudiated Lee, he 
and the Ninth Circuit should be commended for their honest 
application of its precedent—one that others have skillfully avoided 
using the endorsement test. 
 
 180 Lee, 505 U.S. at 582. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Cf. Brief Amici Curiae of Christian Legal Society, et al. in Support of 
Petitioners at 3-4, Newdow III (No. 02-1624) (arguing that “under God” in the Pledge 
is a recognition that the United States is a “limited government grounded in the 
concept that individuals  are endowed by God with certain inalienable rights,” and 
that “government is not the highest authority in human affairs”). 
 183 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270 n.6. 
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B. Escaping Lee via the Endorsement Test 
One looking to avoid a straightforward application of Lee and 
the inevitable result detailed by Justice Thomas has an escape-hatch: 
an application of the Court’s endorsement test cases leads to the 
contrary result that the Pledge is constitutional under the 
Establishment Clause.  Supporters of the Pledge have successfully 
used this tactic.  In Newdow III, the school district failed to even cite 
Lee in the portion of its brief that purported to address whether the 
Pledge is coercive.184  Instead, the school district cited Lynch and 
Allegheny, and analogized the placement of “under God” in the 
context of the other secular messages in the Pledge to Lynch’s 
placement of a crèche in the context of a secular Christmas display, 
concluding that because “the Pledge does not convey a message of 
religious belief or endorsement,” it “cannot fail the coercion test.”185  
Lynch and Allegheny, of course, examined the government’s use of 
religion from the perspective of a reasonable observer, so while the 
school district’s argument is correct as a matter of endorsement test 
precedent, it escapes addressing whether the Pledge coerces 
Newdow’s daughter into religious belief in the Lee sense—from the 
perspective of “primary and secondary school children.”186 
Justice O’Connor, in her Newdow concurring opinion similarly 
devoted six pages to declaring that no reasonable person, aware of 
the “history and ubiquity” of the Pledge would take the words “under 
God” to be an endorsement of religion, but instead would see “under 
God” as a mere “ceremonial deism” with nonreligious purposes.187  
The Pledge, she explained, has contained the words “under God” for 
fifty-years and is “our most routine ceremonial act of patriotism.”188  
In contrast, Justice O’Connor illustrated, “novel or uncommon 
references to religion can more easily be perceived as government 
endorsements because the reasonable observer cannot be presumed 
to be fully familiar with their origins.”189  Just as the school district did, 
Justice O’Connor pointed to Lynch, and the ubiquity of including 
religious crèches in secular Christmas displays to support her point. 
Justice O’Connor does purport to apply the coercion test at the 
 
 184 Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 30-34, Newdow III (No. 02-1624). 
 185 Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
 186 Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. 
 187 Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2321-27 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 188 Id. at 2323 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 189 Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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end of her opinion, however, she never leaves the objective 
perspective of her endorsement test argument when doing so.  She 
stated that “[a]ny coercion that persuades an onlooker to participate 
in an act of ceremonial deism is inconsequential . . . because such 
acts are simply not religious in character.”190  Having already 
established that “under God,” in the eyes of the reasonable observer 
is a “ceremonial deism” devoid of any religious content, the Justice 
conveniently transplants this objective perspective into her coercion 
argument in order to escape the real question demanded by Lee’s 
coercion test: whether a child of elementary school age would believe 
“under God” was devoid of any religious content. 
This tactic of using the endorsement test to avoid addressing the 
coercion issue is illustrative of an observation made a decade ago by 
Professor Leonard Levy, who has been critical of the Court’s 
Establishment Clause decisions.  He contended that the multiple 
Establishment Clause tests do not serve any purpose but to allow the 
Justices to arrive at decisions that comport with their own policy 
preferences under the guise of an objective well-reasoned opinion.191  
These opinions have been unconvincing, wrote Professor Levy, 
“because [the Justices] do not habitually take into serious 
consideration the best arguments advanced by dissenters, by those 
separately concurring, or by losing parties.”192  Indeed, because of the 
endorsement test, Justice O’Connor and others can escape the need 
to consider Newdow’s coercion test arguments at all. 
C.  How the Pledge Can Coerce Without Endorsing 
Courts and commentators have assumed that the result 
suggested here—that “under God” violates the Establishment Clause 
under the coercion test, but does not violate the Establishment Clause 
as an endorsement of religion—is impossible.  In his concurring 
opinion in Lee, Justice Blackmun expressed his agreement with 
Justice Kennedy’s coercion analysis in the majority opinion, but wrote 
to clarify that the Establishment Clause goes further than merely 
“restrain[ing the government] from compelling religious practices: It 
must not engage in them either.  The Court repeatedly has 
recognized that a violation of the Establishment Clause is not 
 
 190 Id. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 191 LEVY, supra note 88, at 154, 156. 
 192 Id. at 223. 
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predicated on coercion.”193  Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun signed on 
to the majority opinion because, “[g]overnment pressure to 
participate in a religious activity is an obvious indication that the 
government is endorsing or promoting religion.”194  Under this 
greater-includes-the-lesser logic, government use of religion that is 
strong enough to coerce religious beliefs or practices, must, a fortiori, 
also merely endorse religion.195  Or, in other words, coercion is a rung 
higher than endorsement on the ladder of Establishment Clause 
violations. 
As a result, using the endorsement test to deny Newdow’s claim 
would at first seem to require the result that “under God” is also not 
coercive, dispensing with the need to even conduct a comparison 
between the Pledge and Lee.  If “under God” is not a strong enough 
use of religion to endorse, how can it possibly coerce?  Indeed, this is 
the reasoning used by the school district against Newdow in lieu of 
actually applying Lee.  It first concluded that the Pledge “does not 
convey a message of religious belief or endorsement,” and asserted 
that as a result, the Pledge “cannot fail the coercion test.”196 
The error with this reasoning, however, is that it falsely assumes 
that the type of coercion at issue in Lee and Newdow was coercion of 
the reasonable observer aware of the “history and ubiquity” of the 
religious speech.  Logically, government religious speech strong 
enough to coerce the reasonable observer would also be an 
endorsement of religion in the eyes of that reasonable observer.  
 
 193 Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  See also id. 
at 619 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[Our precedents] cannot, however, support the 
position that a showing of coercion is necessary to a successful Establishment Clause 
claim.”); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627-28 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment).  Concurring in Allegheny, Justice O’Connor wrote: 
An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only “coercive” 
practices or overt efforts at government proselytization, but fails to take 
account of the numerous more subtle ways that government can show 
favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of disapproval to 
others, would not, in my view, adequately protect the religious liberty 
or respect the religious diversity of the members of our pluralistic 
political community.  Thus, this Court has never relied on coercion 
alone as the touchstone of Establishment Clause analysis. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 194 Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 195 Id.; see also LEVY, supra note 88, at 202-03; CONKLE, supra note 89, at 124 
(“Whenever there is coercion favoring religion, however subtle and indirect, there 
also is advancement or endorsement in violation of the Court’s other Establishment 
Clause tests.”). 
 196 Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 34, Newdow III (No. 02-1624). 
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When on the same playing field, the greater-includes-the-lesser logic 
holds true.  What the school district and others missed, however, is 
that the five-year-old child is not the reasonable observer.  The Lee 
Court recognized this fact, and to be sure, it is essential to its 
reasoning that an impressionable schoolchild (unlike the reasonable 
observer) may be coerced by a school-sponsored religion.197  While to 
an adult reasonable observer “under God” in the Pledge may be a 
“ceremonial deism,” devoid of religious content, to Newdow’s 
daughter, “under God” is, in the words of Justice O’Connor, a “novel 
or uncommon reference[] to religio[n]” because such a young child 
“cannot be presumed to be fully familiar with [the Pledge’s] 
origins.”198  In reality, coercion of an elementary school age child and 
endorsement in the eyes of a reasonable observer are rungs on 
different Establishment Clause ladders altogether.  Therefore, while 
Justice O’Connor may be right as a matter of endorsement test 
precedent that “under God” does not violate the Establishment 
Clause, Justice Thomas is just as correct that, as a matter of coercion 
test precedent (mainly, Lee), “under God” does violate the 
Establishment Clause.  The conundrum created by this distinction 
had Newdow trapped in an Establishment Clause black hole from 
which the next Newdow will need to escape if he hopes to have any 
chance of persuading the Court to apply Lee to the Pledge.  The 
answer to this problem may lie outside of the Establishment Clause 
altogether. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE: CLOSING THE ENDORSEMENT TEST ESCAPE-
HATCH WITH THE FREE EXERCISE AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES 
In order to prevent Pledge proponents from using the 
Establishment Clause’s endorsement test to avoid a straightforward 
application of Lee v. Weisman, the next Newdow should utilize the 
other religion clause.  Essentially, the crux of Newdow’s argument 
against the Pledge was that “under God” interferes with his family’s 
 
 197 For example, in arriving at its holding the Lee Court distinguished Marsh, 463 
U.S. at 795, where the Court held that prayer services held prior to sessions of a state 
legislature are constitutional.  Justice Kennedy pointed out that there are “[i]nherent 
differences between the public school system and a session of a state legislature.”  Lee, 
505 U.S. at 596.  In the former, a state-dominated atmosphere exists that leaves a 
student “with no alternative but to submit” to a government-sponsored religious 
exercise.  Id. at 597.  In the latter, “adults are free to enter and leave” at will, and are 
not subject to the same coercive atmosphere.  Id. 
 198 See Newdow III, 124 S. Ct. at 2323 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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free exercise of atheism.199  While Lee led Newdow to the Establishment 
Clause instead, there are Justices and scholars who argue that the 
coercion test has no place as an Establishment Clause test because 
the Free Exercise Clause already outlaws religious coercion.200  
Indeed, one of the main purposes of the clause is to preserve 
religious voluntarism, or in other words, the right of individuals to 
make private choices about religion free from government 
interference.201  At its core, the Free Exercise Clause bars government 
from regulating religious beliefs—precisely what has upset Newdow 
and other atheist parents about the Pledge.202  If “under God” does 
coerce a child to implicitly  affirm a belief in God in violation of the 
Free Exercise Clause, in turn, that infraction would also violate the 
child’s parents’ complimentary Fourteenth Amendment right to 
direct the religious upbringing of their child.203  The next attack 
against “under God” should lie here, and at the least, this rationale 
will be insulated from the endorsement test escape-hatch, and may 
force the Court to reconcile its decision in Lee and the Pledge.204 
A. The Free Exercise Clause: The Proper Home of Lee v. Weisman’s 
Coercion Test? 
Lee v. Weisman’s use of coercion as the lynchpin of an 
Establishment Clause analysis is controversial because preventing the 
coercion of religious acts and beliefs is already the centerpiece 
protection offered by the Free Exercise Clause.  Justices of the Court 
have pointed out that “[t]o require a showing of coercion, even 
indirect coercion, as an essential element of an Establishment Clause 
 
 199 In fact, Newdow asserted a free exercise claim in his original complaint to the 
District Court for the Eastern District of California, see Original Complaint at ¶¶ 78-
79, Newdow I (No. CIV S-00-0495 MLS PAN PS) (“Plaintiff, under the Free Exercise 
Clause, has an unrestricted right to inculcate in his daughter — free from 
governmental interference — the atheistic beliefs he finds persuasive.  The 
government’s use of the words ‘under God’ in the Nation’s Pledge of Allegiance 
infringes upon this right.”), and in his brief on the merits to the Ninth Circuit, see 
Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellant Appealing District Court’s Order Granting 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 56-57, Newdow II (No. 00-16423).  These claims, 
however, were ignored by both courts.  See Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 
466 (9th Cir. 2002); Newdow v. Cong. of the United States, No. CIV S-00-0495 MLS 
PAN PS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22367 at *1-3 (E.D. Cal. May 25, 2000). 
 200 See infra Part IV.A. 
 201 See infra Part IV.B. 
 202 See infra Part IV.C. 
 203 See infra Part IV.D. 
 204 See infra Part IV.E. 
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violation would make the Free Exercise Clause a redundancy,”205 or 
conversely, would reduce the Establishment Clause to an “ornament” 
with no meaning independent of the Free Exercise Clause.206  This 
redundancy argument has substantial support among Justices,207 legal 
scholars,208 and Court precedent.209  Professor Laycock forcefully 
argues that an exclusive Establishment Clause coercion standard 
would “abandon the goal of government neutrality toward and 
among religions.”210  Regardless of whether coercion should have any 
proper role in Establishment Clause analysis, this debate illustrates 
that religious coercion is undisputedly a free exercise concern.211 
 
 205 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 628 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (citing Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim 
About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 922 (1986) (“If coercion is also an 
element of the establishment clause, establishment adds nothing to free exercise.”)). 
 206 Lee, 505 U.S. at 621 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 207 Justice Souter agrees with Justice O’Connor, and has argued that because “laws 
that coerce non-adherents to ‘support or participate in any religion or its 
exercise,’ . . . by definition violate their right to religious free exercise,” using the 
coercion test “render[s] the Establishment Clause a virtual nullity.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 
621 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-60 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 619 (Souter, J., 
concurring) (“[Our precedents] cannot, however, support the position that a 
showing of coercion is necessary to a successful Establishment Clause claim.”); id. at 
604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Although our precedents make clear that proof of 
government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation, it 
is sufficient.”). 
 208 LEVY, supra note 88, at 159, 201; see also Suszanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: 
Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 135 (1992) (arguing that “[i]f all government 
coercion concerning religious beliefs violates the Free Exercise Clause, a coercion-
based Establishment Clause does not prohibit anything that is not independently 
prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause”); see generally Laycock, Noncoercive, supra note 
122, at 37; but see Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986) (arguing for a coercion-based Establishment Clause 
test); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 843 n.171 
(1993) (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause prevents government from coercing 
people out of practicing their religion, while the Establishment Clause prevents 
government from coercing people into practicing religion). 
 209 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688; Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
223 (1963) (“The distinction between the two clauses is apparent—a violation of the 
Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause 
violation need not be so attended.”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (“The 
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause does not depend upon any 
showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws 
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce 
nonobserving individuals or not.”). 
 210 Laycock, Noncoercive, supra note 122, at 69. 
 211 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (stating that 
under the Free Exercise Clause, “government may not compel affirmation of 
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Additionally it shows that Lee’s coercion-centered analysis, which led 
Newdow to centrally rely upon the Establishment Clause instead,212 
was perhaps a majority-building anomaly instead of the declaration of 
a new stand-alone test.  This suggests that Lee’s coercion test may be a 
better fit as a free exercise rationale, and that the Free Exercise 
Clause may be the more logical place to assert a claim based upon a 
parent’s concern over his child’s freedom from religious belief.  At 
least one federal court has applied Lee’s coercion test in evaluating a 
free exercise claim.213  The Free Exercise Clause’s underlying 
rationale of protecting private religious choices, and its largely 
untapped bar against the regulation of religious beliefs, provides 
support for such an approach. 
B. The Free Exercise Clause & Religious Voluntarism: Protecting 
Private Religious Choices 
The “first and foremost” value of the Free Exercise Clause is 
religious voluntarism.214  Voluntarism is “the principle of personal 
choice,”215 and in the religion context, it represents the ideal that an 
individual should have “the freedom to make religious choices for 
oneself, free from governmental compulsion or improper 
influence.”216 
 
religious belief”) (citing Torcaso, 378 U.S. at 488); Laycock, Noncoercive, supra note 
122, at 41; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 1149 n.1 (“Although these theories 
[including the coercion test] have been presented and discussed most by the Justices 
and commentators in the context of the Establishment Clause, they also can be used 
in Free Exercise Clause analysis.”). 
 212 Although Newdow did raise free exercise claims in his original complaint, they 
were not addressed.  See supra note 199. 
 213 See Meyers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1271-72 (E.D. 
Va. 2003). 
 214 CONKLE, supra note 89, at 72; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 818-19 (1988) (“The free exercise clause was at the very least designed to 
guarantee freedom of conscience by preventing any degree of compulsion in matters 
of belief.”); Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal 
Development Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 517 (1968) 
(“Religious voluntarism, of course, is an important aspect of the freedom of 
conscience guaranteed by the free exercise clause.”).  There is considerable 
agreement among scholars that religious voluntarism is one of the major underlying 
rationales for both religion clauses, and its importance is also reflected in Article VI, 
Section Three of the Constitution, which states that “no religious test shall ever be 
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.”  
William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson’s Crumbling Wall—A 
Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 772 (1984). 
 215 Van Alstyne, supra note 214, at 778. 
 216 CONKLE, supra note 89, at 38; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) 
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The importance of voluntarism in the American conception of 
religious liberty can be traced back to the beginnings of colonization, 
when settlers left Europe to escape laws that forced them to worship 
in churches of the state’s choosing, rather than their own.217  As 
Justice Black explained in his oft-cited description of the history of 
the religion clauses in Everson v. Board of Education,218 the colonies 
inherited Europe’s practice of state-sponsored religion partially in the 
form of taxes designed to pay ministers and build churches.219  This 
angered many colonists who felt that “individual religious liberty 
could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all 
power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or 
to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.”220  
Tensions over religious taxes came to a head in Virginia in 1784, 
where a bill was introduced to institute a tax to pay the salaries of 
teachers of Christianity.221  Leading the successful opposition to the 
bill, James Madison listed fifteen reasons in his Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments for why the tax should be 
defeated.222  Reason number one was religious voluntarism.223  
Madison wrote that it was an “undeniable truth” that allegiance to a 
religion can only be directed “by reason and conviction, not by force 
or violence,” and thus, “[t]he [r]eligion then of every man must be 
left to the conviction and conscience of every man,” not civil 
government.224  Soon after the defeat of the tax, the Virginia 
legislature passed the Virginia Act for Establishing Religious 
Freedom.225  Thomas Jefferson authored the Act, and, similar to 
 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the protection of religious liberty is the 
“common purpose” of the religion clauses); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 305 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (same); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (same).  
Additionally, Professor William Van Alstyne has described religious voluntarism as 
deriving “largely from the moderate spirit of religious toleration associated with the 
Quaker tradition of Pennsylvania.”  Van Alstyne, supra note 214, at 773. 
 217 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8. 
 218 Id. at 13. 
 219 Id. at 10-11. 
 220 Id. at 11. 
 221 See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWIN MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
171 (2001). 
 222 See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (June 
20, 1785), reprinted in NOONAN, id. at 173-78. 
 223 See id. at 173. 
 224 See id. 
 225 Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (Michie 
1995) (enacted Jan. 16, 1786). 
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Madison, he stressed religious voluntarism by declaring that 
“[a]lmighty God hath created the mind free,” and “all attempts to 
influence it . . . are a departure from the plan of the Holy Author of 
our religion, who, being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not 
to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power 
to do . . . .”226 
Although framers like Jefferson and Madison often made 
statements supporting complete neutrality with respect to all religious 
matters,227 this “substantive idea of religious liberty was firmly 
rooted . . . not in secular philosophy, but rather in theology,” 
reflecting the dominance of Christianity in early American political 
and social life.228  Thus, this early conception of religious liberty (i.e., 
voluntarism) was one of, what Professor Daniel Conkle calls, 
“denominational equality”: government encouragement of 
Christianity as a whole was permissible as long as it did not interfere 
with individuals’ freedom of conscience within sects of Christianity.229  
This Christian understanding of religious voluntarism dominated 
Supreme Court precedents230 up until the 1960s, when the Court 
abandoned its legal favoritism of Christianity and adopted an 
approach of “religious neutrality”231—not only between different 
 
 226 See id.  The bill further denounces: 
the impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as 
ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, 
have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own 
opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as 
such endeavoring to impose them on others, have established and 
maintained false religions over the greatest part of the world, and 
through all time. 
Id. 
 227 In his Remonstrance, Madison argues that matters of religion should be “wholly 
exempt” from the cognizance of government. NOONAN, supra note 221, at 173.  
Jefferson, in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, famously wrote: “I 
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which 
declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation 
between church and State.” See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
 228 Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From Original Theology to 
Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 3-5 (2000) [hereinafter, 
Conkle, Path]. 
 229 Id. at 6-8. 
 230 See, e.g., United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931) (stating that “we 
are a Christian people according to one another the equal right of religious 
freedom”) Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) 
(stating that “this is a Christian nation”). 
 231 Conkle further acknowledges and discusses the distinctions between “formal” 
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religions,232 but also between religion and non-religion.233  The Court 
explicitly detailed this shift to neutrality in Wallace v. Jaffree.234  In that 
case, the Court used the Establishment Clause to overturn an 
Alabama law which allowed for a minute of silence each day in public 
schools “for meditation or voluntary prayer.”235  Before applying the 
Lemon test to strike down the law, Justice Stevens explained that it was 
once thought that religious voluntarism merely prevented 
government from preferring “one Christian sect over another, but 
would not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the 
atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith.”236  Justice Stevens 
explained, however, that “the individual freedom of conscience 
protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any 
religious faith or none at all.”237 
C. The Free Exercise Clause’s Absolute Bar on the Regulation of Beliefs 
Reflecting its core value of religious voluntarism,238 the Free 
Exercise Clause protects freedom of conscience by absolutely barring 
 
and “substantive” religious neutrality, coined by Professor Laycock.  See Conkle, Path, 
supra note 228, at 9 (citing Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated 
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990)).  However, this distinction 
is not critical for purposes of the discussion here. 
 232 See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause . . . 
means at least [that the Federal Government cannot] pass laws which aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”). 
 233 See Conkle, Path, supra note 228, at 8-10; see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40; Walz v. 
Tax Comm’n of N. Y., 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Neutrality 
and voluntarism stand as barriers against the most egregious and hence divisive kinds 
of state involvement in religious matters.”); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 216 (“[T]his Court 
has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only 
governmental preference of one religion over another.”); id. at 305 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (“The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that 
government neither engage in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no 
favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion.”); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 
495 (“[N]either a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally . . . pass 
laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers.”); 
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (“[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in 
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers.”). 
 234 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 235 Id. at 40. 
 236 See id. at 52 (footnotes omitted). 
 237 Id. at 53 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Justice Stevens was particularly 
cognizant of the threat of persecution against the disbeliever, recognizing that “the 
political interest in forestalling intolerance extends beyond intolerance among 
Christian sects – or even intolerance among ‘religions’—to encompass intolerance of 
the disbeliever and the uncertain.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 238 See supra Part IV.B. 
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any government attempts to compel, outlaw, or regulate religious 
belief or disbelief.239  This includes a direct attempt to compel 
affirmation of religious belief.  In Torcaso v. Watkins,240 the Court 
overturned a Maryland law that required individuals to declare a 
belief in the existence of God as a prerequisite to holding public 
office.241  Torcaso was offered a commission from the Governor of 
Maryland to serve as a Notary Public but was forced to decline 
because he refused to take the religious oath.242  Torcaso sued for his 
commission on the grounds that the requirement violated his free 
exercise rights.243  The Court agreed, and in striking down the 
religious test, pointed out that many colonists had left Europe for 
America to escape such religious tests so they could practice their 
religion freely.244  According to the Court, the Free Exercise Clause 
was passed in order to prevent such regulation of beliefs, and thus 
government cannot “constitutionally pass laws or impose 
requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and 
[cannot] aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God 
as against those religions founded on different beliefs.”245 
As central as the freedom of belief is to the Free Exercise Clause, 
it rarely forms the basis for litigation.246  Instead, most free exercise 
challenges involve laws that burden religiously motivated conduct.247  
 
 239 Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 877 (“The free exercise of religion means, first and 
foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”) 
(citing Sherbert and Torcaso among other cases); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 
(1963) (“The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any 
governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.”); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495; 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. 
 240 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
 241 Id. at 496. 
 242 Id. at 489. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. at 490. 
 245 Id. at 495. 
 246 See CONKLE, supra note 89, at 75; GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1445 (14th ed. 2001); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523 (1993) (“The principle that 
government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice is so well 
understood that few violations are recorded in our opinions.”). 
 247 See CONKLE, supra note 89, at 75; GUNTHER, supra note 246, at 1445.  Although 
laws that attempt to regulate religious belief are in all cases invalid, laws that regulate 
religious conduct can be justified by certain government interests.  In Employment Div., 
494 U.S. at 878, the Court announced that neutral laws of general applicability that 
happen to regulate religious conduct are valid under the Free Exercise Clause as 
long as government can show there is a rational basis for the law.  494 U.S. 872, 878 
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Some commentators maintain that the lack of litigation over attempts 
to control religious beliefs is due to the fact that our government is 
not inclined to make such attempts.248  While today this may be 
generally true, in 1954 Congress expressly stated that the daily 
inculcation of children with a religious message was its goal when 
passing the law that added “under God” to the Pledge.249  In light of 
this express Congressional purpose, is hard to see how the addition of 
“under God” is not a blatant “governmental regulation of religious 
beliefs as such.”250  Congress cleverly used the Pledge and its daily 
recitation in the public classroom as a vehicle for the delivery of an 
affirmation of the existence of God to the minds of millions of 
schoolchildren.  Applying Torcaso and Lee to this attempt at mind-
control results in the unconstitutionality of “under God,” under the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
Torcaso held that the Free Exercise Clause prevents government 
from legally compelling an individual to affirm a belief in God.251  
Similarly, Barnette held that the Free Speech Clause prevents 
government from legally compelling an individual to recite the (pre-
“under God”) Pledge of Allegiance.252  Reciting the Pledge of 
Allegiance with the words “under God” requires the speaker to affirm 
a belief in God.253  Thus, as a matter of free exercise, Torcaso would 
now appear to also bar government from legally compelling an 
individual to recite the Pledge with “under God.”  Of course, post-
Barnette, public schools may no longer legally compel students to say 
the Pledge, but instead must make participation voluntary.  This 
 
(1990).  A law that burdens religious conduct is only held to the higher standard of 
strict scrutiny if it regulates religious conduct for the reason that it is religious.  Id. at 
877. 
 248 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky wrote that “[g]overnments . . . do not adopt laws 
prohibiting or requiring thoughts; statutes invariably regulate conduct.”  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 1200.  Professor Daniel Conkle similarly states, “[a]s a 
practical matter, it is virtually impossible – in the absence of incredibly coercive and 
intrusive means – to control the inner thoughts that people hold, and thankfully, our 
contemporary government is not inclined to make the effort.”  CONKLE, supra note 
89, at 75. 
 249 See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress’s 
addition of “under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance. 
 250 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402. 
 251 Torcaso, 378 U.S. 488. 
 252 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 253 See supra notes 158-173 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the 
words “under God” in the Pledge do have religious content and cause the speaker to 
affirm the existence of God. 
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would solve both the Free Exercise problem under Torcaso, and the 
Free Speech problem under Barnette, were it not for Lee, which 
declared that subtle coercive pressure “can be as real as any overt 
compulsion.”254  As demonstrated by Part III.A, above, there is more 
of a threat of subtle coercive pressure involved with the Pledge of 
Allegiance than there was in Lee.  Therefore, substitute Torcaso and 
Barnette’s legal compulsion with Lee’s coercion, and the daily 
repetition of the Pledge with “under God” in public schools violates 
both the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause.  That the 
Pledge would violate both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses 
simultaneously makes sense given that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause 
embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has close 
parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment,”255 and 
that some scholars suggest that the Free Exercise Clause is really no 
more than a protection of religious speech.256  Thus, if being coerced 
into reciting the Pledge of Allegiance violates Free Speech, reciting 
the religious part of the Pledge, “under God” should also violate the 
Free Exercise Clause.  It is a conclusion that was recognized by the 
Seventh Circuit in Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 
21.257  Judge Easterbrook wrote that: 
[i]f as Barnette holds no state may require anyone to recite the 
Pledge, and if as [Lee] hold[s] the recitation by a teacher or rabbi 
of unwelcome words is coercion, then the Pledge of Allegiance 
becomes unconstitutional under all circumstances, just as no 
school may read from a holy scripture at the start of class.  As an 
analogy this is sound.  As an understanding of the first 
amendment it is defective . . . .258 
“Defective,” because Judge Easterbrook went on to use the 
endorsement test to escape applying Lee’s coercion test in the first 
place, and concluded, similarly to Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
Newdow III opinion, that “under God” is religiously meaningless 
ceremonial deism.259 
Under the Free Exercise Clause, however, there is no 
 
 254 Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. 
 255 Id. at 591. 
 256 Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 71 
(2001). 
 257 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 258 Id. at 444. 
 259 See id. at 445-48; see also supra Part II.B.2 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Sherman. 
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endorsement test escape from coercion.  Additionally, a Free Exercise 
Clause claim presents a better alternative than a Free Speech claim 
against the Pledge because of Newdow’s other concern: the ability of 
a parent to direct the religious (or non-religious) education of his 
child without government interference. 
D. The Fundamental Right of Parents to Direct the Religious 
Upbringing of Their Children 
It is common sense that parents shape their children’s religious 
beliefs and practices to match their own, and indeed many faiths 
require parents to do so.260  Accordingly, the Court has held that 
parents have a fundamental, Fourteenth Amendment due process261 
right to direct the religious upbringing of their children free from 
government interference.262  Thus, in the past, when a free exercise 
claim has been brought on behalf of a child, courts have often also 
treated the claim as one where the parents’ rights are at stake as 
well.263 
This right has its roots in the landmark case of Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters.264  In Pierce, an Oregon law compelled all children between the 
ages of eight and sixteen to attend public school.265  A private 
religious school brought suit, arguing that because the law denied 
parents the opportunity to choose a religious education for their 
child, the law denied parents their due process right to direct their 
child’s education.266  The Court agreed, and held that “the 
 
 260 See Note, Children as Believers: Minors’ Free Exercise Rights and the Psychology of 
Religious Development, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2205, 2205 (2002) [hereinafter Children]. 
 261 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law.”). 
 262 See Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (holding that a compulsory 
school law “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents . . . to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control,” and thus, the Free 
Exercise Clause requires an exemption for the children of Amish parents).  But see id. 
at 241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing the Yoder Court for allowing 
parents to dictate their children’s beliefs when the Bill of Rights is supposed to afford 
children the same protections as adults). 
 263 See Children, supra note 260, at 2212.  The author of this note points out the 
anomaly that when courts review free exercise challenges brought by parents on 
behalf of their children they “generally do not bother to disaggregate the children’s 
and parent’s rights,” and suggests a “parents’ rights” theory as one possible 
explanation. Id. at 2209-10. 
 264 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 265 Id. at 531. 
 266 Id. at 532-34. 
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fundamental theory of liberty . . . excludes any general power of the 
state to standardize its children,” by mandating that they receive a 
public education.267  The Court stated that “[t]he child is not the 
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his 
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations.”268 
Nearly fifty years later in Wisconsin v. Yoder,269 the Supreme Court 
explained that a child’s preparation for “additional obligations” 
includes the specific right of parents to direct the formation of their 
children’s religious beliefs.270  In Yoder, Amish parents challenged 
their conviction under a state law mandating school attendance for 
all children until the age of sixteen.271  The parents argued that their 
religious beliefs barred their fourteen and fifteen-year-old children 
from attending organized schooling, and thus, compliance with the 
law would violate both their free exercise rights and their right to 
direct the education of their children under the Due Process 
Clause.272  The Supreme Court agreed, overturned the convictions, 
and stated that “Pierce stands as a charter of the rights of parents to 
direct the religious upbringing of their children.”273  The Court 
further held that when this right is “combined with a free exercise 
claim . . . more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose 
within the competency of the State’ is required to sustain the validity 
of the State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”274 
Thus, the Court has recognized that the free exercise rights of a 
child, which includes freedom from government influence over 
conscience, goes hand-in-hand with the right of that child’s parents 
to direct what beliefs with regard to religion will be instilled in the 
child—mirroring exactly Newdow’s primary objection over “under 
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance. 
E. Insulating the Coercion Issue from Endorsement 
This alternative free exercise-due process approach offers the 
 
 267 Id. at 534-35. 
 268 Id. at 535. 
 269 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 270 Id. at 233. 
 271 Id. at 207. 
 272 Id. at 208-09. 
 273 Id. at 233. 
 274 Id. (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535). 
   
786 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:739 
 
 
attractive benefit of insulating a Lee coercion claim against the Pledge 
from the Establishment Clause’s endorsement test escape-hatch.  As 
long as the dichotomy between the endorsement test’s adult 
reasonable observer perspective, and the coercion test’s school-aged 
child perspective exists, proponents of the Pledge will always be able 
to circumvent applying the Lee coercion test by resorting to the 
endorsement test.  Either by declaring that “under God” is not an 
endorsement to the reasonable person and therefore cannot fail the 
coercion test,275 or by transplanting the endorsement test’s reasonable 
person point-of-view into the coercion test analysis,276 supporters of 
“under God” can use the inconsistent state of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence to their advantage. 
In contrast, the Free Exercise Clause’s prohibition on the 
regulation of beliefs is often stated,277 but rarely utilized in litigation.278  
As a result, a future litigant would have almost a blank slate to work 
with, free from the tortured tests of the Establishment Clause, which 
could be used to advantage by focusing the claim, and the Court’s 
attention, on the basic principles of the Free Exercise Clause’s bar on 
regulation of beliefs: voluntarism and noncoercion.279  This could 
help force a discussion towards whether “under God” actually 
jeopardizes a child’s freedom of belief and conscience in the Lee 
sense, and away from irrelevant discussions about how the Pledge 
compares to non-classroom public references to God.  Additionally, a 
focus on voluntarism and noncoercion could open the door for 
serious Court consideration of psychological studies demonstrating 
that the inculcation of religious references does have an effect on a 
child’s developing belief system.280  While such studies were presented 
to the Court in Newdow III, they were completely ignored in favor of 
the Establishment Clause’s concepts of endorsement and ceremonial 
deism.281 
 
 275 See supra note 196. 
 276 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 277 See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 278 See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 279 See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of the Free Exercise Clause’s underlying 
principle of religious voluntarism. 
 280 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.  Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483, 494 n.11 (1954) (relying upon psychological studies to demonstrate that public 
school segregation denied African-Americans equal protection by “generat[ing] a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone”). 
 281 Id. 
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Once this foundation is laid, the litigant would then be in a 
position to point to the Court’s main free exercise case relying on the 
freedom of belief principle—Torcaso v. Watkins282—for support.  
When utilized in combination with Lee’s coercion principle, a case 
can be made that the Pledge, with “under God,” coerces 
impressionable schoolchildren into believing and affirming the 
existence of God, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.  In turn, 
this governmental interference with a child’s thoughts obstructs a 
parent from being the sole, directing influence in that child’s 
religious belief system, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Admittedly, this approach has many unknowns,283 and Justices 
bent on upholding the Pledge are unlikely to be deterred no matter 
what arguments or evidence are presented to them.  But at the least, 
forcing the Court to somehow explain away the rationale of Lee while 
upholding “under God” may expose the hypocrisy of claiming that a 
one-time prayer containing secular and religious messages can coerce 
a middle-school student, but yet a daily Pledge containing similar 
secular and religious messages cannot coerce a five-year-old.  A free 
exercise-plus-due process claim has the potential to focus attention 
where it properly belongs—on schoolchildren and their parents, not 
on the Pledge.  Far too much attention during the Newdow 
controversy was paid to Pledge itself and other uses of God in public 
life that have no bearing on the question of whether “under God” 
causes a child and her parents injury when employed in the 
classroom.  This shift in perspective would take place by taking from 
proponents of “under God” use of the Establishment Clause’s 
endorsement test, which makes it possible to avoid choosing between 
overturning Lee v. Weisman, or honestly applying its coercion test to 
the use of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Lee v. Weisman must have looked enticing to Michael Newdow.  
Despite its promise, it led him to an Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence in disarray, a Court unwilling to choose one analytical 
 
 282 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
 283 This comment does not purport to address all of the possible pitfalls that may 
exist in asserting such a free exercise claim, but rather to suggest that this may be a 
more attractive avenue to explore. 
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test, and opponents who have used this to their advantage to avoid 
the unavoidable result—acknowledged by Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
and Judge Easterbrook—that “under God” in the public classroom is 
unconstitutional under Lee v. Weisman.  Newdow certainly is not the 
only atheist parent to come home dismayed that his child now 
reflexively believes that the United States is a “nation under God” 
because of the daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.  When the 
next Newdow brings his claim before the federal courts, he will have 
the opportunity to learn from Newdow’s experience and try a new 
approach towards getting the Court to seriously confront whether the 
Pledge adversely influences a child’s religious freedom of conscience.  
That new approach could lie in the Free Exercise and Due Process 
Clauses. 
 
